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ARTICLES

Universal Religion . . . . . MARTIN P. NILSSON 5

The Melā at Kaṅkalitalla . . . . . KURT F. LEIDECKER 11

Hīnayāna and Religious Paradox: a Review-Article . . . . . EDWARD J. MACHLE 23

Mr. Stace at the Intersection of Time and Eternity: a Review-Article . . . . . JOSEPH KATZ 29

BOOK REVIEWS

Mircea Eliade: *Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'exstase* . . . . . (R. A. STEIN) 36

Raymond Firth: *Elements of Social Organization* . . . . . (WILLIAM J. GOODE) 38

Karl Kerényi: *Niobe: Neue Studien über antike Religion und Humanität* . . . . . .
Pythagoras und Orpheus: Präludien zu einer zukünftigen Geschichte der Orphik und des Pythagoreismus . . . . . (Jacob Hammer) 40

Henri Maspero: *Les religions chinoises* . . . . . .
Le Taoïsme . . . . . .
Études historiques sur la Chine . . . . (N. V. Nicolas) 45

L. Sherley-Price: *Confucius and Christ* . . . . . .
Karl Ludwig Reichelt: *Religion in Chinese Garment* . . . . . (A. K. Reischauer) 47

Louis Finkelstein, ed.: *The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion* . . . . . (Joseph L. Blau) 51

Geoffrey Grimshaw Willis: *Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy* . . . . . (Stanislaus J. Grabowski) 54

Nicholas Bozon: *Seven More Poems.* Ed. and tr. by Sister M. Amelia (Klenke) . . . . . (Jean Misrahi) 56

Robert P. Prentice, O.F.M.: *The Psychology of Love according to St. Bonaventure* . . . . . (Herta Pauly) 60

Robert Friedmann: *Mennonite Piety through the Centuries* . . . . . (Ray C. Petry) 63

Ernest A. Strathmann: *Sir Walter Ralegh: a Study in Elizabethan Skepticism* . . . . . (Henry W. Wells) 67

Maud Bodkin: *Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy* . . . . . .
Werner Wolff: *Changing Concepts of the Bible: a Psychological Analysis of Its Words, Symbols and Beliefs* . . . . . (Erwin R. Goodenough) 69

Eleanor Bustin Mattes: *In Memoriam: the Way of a Soul* . . . . . (Frances E. White) 73

H. Richard Niebuhr: *Christ and Culture* . . (Edwin E. Aubrey) 75

Alan W. Watts: *The Supreme Identity* . . (Howard H. Brinton) 77

Book Notes 81

Among the Periodicals 105

UNIVERSAL RELIGION*

MARTIN P. NILSSON
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IN MY EXHAUSTIVE ACCOUNT of the history of Greek religion in late antiquity *(Geschichte der griechischen Religion,* II), I have tried to emphasize one seemingly too little considered, but important, cause of Christianity's victory in the religious contest of late antiquity—its universality. The universal empire needed a universal religion, a need which, in different ways, appeared also in ancient paganism, in philosophy, in syncretism, and in certain general, widespread religious ideas. But all these were merely groping attempts; they were abortive and never reached the goal.

All forms of religion in late antiquity except Christianity were, in some degree, bound to nationality. Those who sought a higher grade in the Isis cult shaved their heads and garbed themselves in linen garments like the Egyptians. Servants of the Great Mother and Attis bore the name of the people from whom her cult had come; they were called Gauls. One of the degrees in the mysteries of Mithra was named "the Persian." Isis' Egyptian origin was strongly emphasized, as were the Great Mother's Phrygian and Mithra's Persian source. Those who attached themselves to the Jewish religion had to let themselves be circumcised and observe the dietary regulations.

Christianity sprung from Judaism's bosom. The Evangelists' testimony gives conflicting answers to the question whether, and to what degree, its founder held fast to the Jewish inheritance, or if, and to what extent, he broke it and sought to gather all mankind under the shadow of his wings. This question may well never be settled for certain.

With Paul it is settled. He is universalism's champion. His letters are full of opposition to the Jewish Law and to circumcision, demands which were held fast by Jewish Christians and placed the greatest obstacles in the way of Christianity's diffusion among the heathen. Of the many heathen who felt themselves drawn to Judaism, few became members; the great majority were satisfied to be half-followers, "god-fearing," as they were called. For Paul it was of no consequence whether a man

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was Jew or Greek, if only he believed in Christ. Thereby he established the universality of Christ as savior of all mankind, independent of nation and race, and thus Jesus was detached from connections with his national origin, for the Jews had rejected him. The Jewish-Christian community became a relic which soon disappeared. Universalism conquered, and this was the prerequisite of Christianity's victory.

The problem of a universal religion, however, concerns not only late antiquity and its conflicts; it is universal in time as well as in the world. There are several religions which can lay claim to being universal. The problem is more extensive and deserves to be considered exactly in its universality.

All the so-called primitive religions and those of the older civilizations are bound up with tribe, nation, and land. Elements may be adopted from other religions, but they cannot pass beyond their boundaries without losing their original character. This applies to all the ancient religions, the Greek as well as the Egyptian and Babylonian. A universal religion must possess certain cardinal points which men can appropriate irrespective of tribe, nation, and land.

There are three such religions, all of which arose through a revolutionary religious reform: Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam. If one seeks to find the basic principal ideas and see whether there is something common to them all which, consequently, characterizes a universal religion, one finds the following. Christianity has a God who creates and governs the world and enjoins his commandments upon mankind, and it has a savior who rescues man from need and fear. Buddhism has no God, but has a savior who lays his commands upon men and, by his teaching, saves them from need and fear. Islam has a God who enjoins his commands upon men, but it has no savior. It is a simplified and cruder form of the Jewish-Christian religion.

Each of these three religions exhibit many great divergences among different peoples and in different countries, depending upon historical circumstances, historical development, and the peoples' diverse aptitudes, cultures, and living conditions. One may compare the Greek Orthodox Church with Protestantism, the Abyssinian Church with Calvinism, South Indian with Tibetan Buddhism, the "Little and the Great Vehicle," Sunna and Shia; the various directions in which each of these religions appears have, in historic times, burst forth from one

and the same root; the basic main ideas found in all separate branches which have grown from the root.

Two other religions have had certain qualifications for development into universal religions, Judaism and Zarathustrianism. Judaism had a God who laid claim to universality and enjoined his commandments on mankind, but Judaism lost its possibility of universality by the assertion of its own right of precedence as God's peculiar people, and by its implacable adherence to demands which, in and of themselves, possess no religious or moral content—circumcision and dietary restrictions. Those who were admitted to the Jewish religious community were obliged to submit to these and be taken into the Jewish national community as well. Christianity transcended this inheritance; it mattered not to it whether a man was Jew or Greek.

Zarathustrianism had a God who creates the world and lays his commands upon men, and, besides, a sharp dualism between good and evil clearly set forth. But in the Achaemenian period Zarathustrianism mingled to a great degree with the pagan folk-religion, and, when it was restored under the Sassanids, it stiffened into a ritualism which brought death to the living religious spirit. Its valuable religious ideas were taken over by others, Judaism and Christianity.

Christianity has a God and a savior; Buddhism a savior but no God; Islam a God but no savior. Neither of these two basic ideas seem to be indispensable for a universal religion. We must look deeper.

Høffding has said that the ground of religion is faith in the conservation of values. I should say, rather, that it is man's protest against the meaninglessness of life and the world. He who stands by an untimely grave may have the chain of causality set forth—an illness and its causes, an accident and its antecedents—but he asks why has this befallen him? Why has this come upon me? Why has he, why have I, deserved this? Man is not satisfied with the mechanistic happening—causality; it is meaningless for him, for it is something external, irrelevant; it does not belong to him. He seeks for something which stirs him—his faith, his actions, his expectations. He seeks for a meaning in events which he can grasp.

This seeking finds its expression in religion, in a God who creates and guides the world, not according to automatic consequences but according to his will, who directs events with meaning, who makes his claims

on man, and lays his commandments upon him. If there is no God who directs events, he seeks an escape from the meaningless happening. This Buddhism does.

For Buddhism the meaningless occurrence is evil; life is suffering. The opposition of good and evil is primary, self-evident. There are evil and good things, creatures, desires, words, and therefore evil and good men, evil and good powers. In religions which possess gods or a God, transgressions of their commands and neglect in fulfilling their claims are evil. The world is divided between the good and the evil, and the same division can be brought into the supernatural world. Zarathustrianism does this consistently. Against Ahura Mazda, his hosts and his servants, is placed Ahriman, his hosts and his servants. This is the Iranian dualism whose stage is the world, which is divided between the evil and the good. From it Christianity took the prince of evil and darkness, upon whom devolved a fearful role.

The fact remains, as man discovers, that also he himself bears the evil within him—evil lusts, evil thoughts which lead to evil acts. He knows this as transgression against the gods' or God's commands, and from this follows the consciousness of sin and guilt. The feeling that evil adheres to man and permeates the world condenses itself into the conviction that the material world is essentially evil and that the good is only in the supersensible world. This is the Greek dualism which has its ground in Plato's transcendentalism. In practice it leads to flight from the world and asceticism, the endeavor to suppress the physical in man and free the divine spark of good which is united with the material body.

Thus consciousness of the power of evil and of transgression leads to the other main idea. Certainly man seeks to keep God's commandments, and from this there can develop legalism and ritualism which lay a dead hand on religion. Self-justification does not always reach the whole way, however; it gives place to a sense of one's own guilt and wickedness, accompanied by fear and need. Man's own strength is insufficient; he needs someone to depend upon, someone to help him out of need and fear—a savior. A religious man rebels, consciously or unconsciously, against the philosophers' doctrine of man's perfectibility, which reality puts to shame. Man seeks deliverance from evil, salvation from need and fear. He needs a savior. For Islam this need does not exist; it has the same legalistic standpoint as Judaism.

Christianity, which knows a God who guides the world, and sees meaning in world events and the happenings which concern man, holds itself to the last named point of view, salvation from man's guilt. Buddhism, which has no God who creates and governs the world, must hold fast to the other viewpoint, the meaninglessness of events, intensified by life's suffering. The world, life, is a series of causes in which each single cause brings forth a new cause. Thus one can describe karma with a word taken from Cicero's definition of Heimarmene (Fate). From this chain of causation man seeks to escape by keeping Buddha's commands and doctrine.

The similarity between Buddha and Christ is often pointed out, often exaggerated. The fundamental difference lies in this, that, according to Buddha, man, if he can follow his teaching, through his own striving is freed from the meaninglessness of existence, its suffering; while, according to Christianity, he is freed from guilt and the fear of guilt by the atoning death of Christ. Buddhism's deliverance remains more on the surface; its salvation is of a negative character. This has been changed fundamentally, moreover, in the sects belonging to the "Great Vehicle."

All these three religions, however, are not actually universal in the truest meaning of the word, not global, world embracing. Christianity has, through its missions, made a certain effort in this direction, but with only sporadic success. The future will show whether a religion which not only is universal in its principle but comprises all men can gain the upper hand or come into existence.

Occasionally one hears Soviet ideology described as religion, although it seems to be the strongest contrast to religion, since it is exclusively materialistic. But there are points which come close to religion and show how inseparable religion is from man's spiritual world. The cult of the ruler strikingly reminds one of the ancient ruler cult, however much it lacks the ancient characteristic religious ceremonial. The ruler is a savior, σωτήρ, like the Hellenistic kings and Roman emperors. Mankind must submit to his commands unconditionally. As an answer to the meaninglessness of life, service to the state is set up as its purpose. One asks, serve the state for what purpose? The answer is for the establishment of the kingdom of perfection; one is tempted to say, God's kingdom on earth. The difference is that this earthly kingdom of bliss is one of many social utopias which history passes by and is going to pass by,

whose judgment is not given the lie. For religion, the kingdom of bliss, be it the heavenly Jerusalem or Nirvana, is not of this world.

In this connection it may be of interest to quote an utterance of Mani, in the newly discovered Manichean manuscripts from Egypt:

> As for him who chose his church in the West, his church did not reach the East; as for him who chose his church in the (East), the product of his choosing did not reach the West. . . . But my hope will go to the West and also to the East, and the voice of its proclamation will be heard in all languages, and it will be proclaimed in all cities. The earlier churches were chosen in individual places and in individual cities, but my church will go forth into (all) cities, and its (message) will reach every land (Kephalaia, ch. 154).[1]

This may be assigned to the period around A.D. 250, when Christianity had not penetrated the East, i.e., Persia and beyond, and Buddhism had not reached the West.

1. C. Schmidt and H. J. Polotsky, "Eine Mani-fund aus Ägypten: Originalschriften des Mani und seiner Schüler" (*Sitzungsberichte Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin.* Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1933, p. 45).

THE MELĀ AT KAṄKALITALLA

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THE BENGALI NEW YEAR falls on the first day of the month of Vaisakha (April-May) or the 14th of April and is celebrated with appropriate festivities by the Hindu population as well as the Moslems living in West Bengal, this most densely populated State of the Indian Union.

On the day preceding it, or the last day of the Bengali year, a great *melā* or religious festival takes place at a spot about 100 miles almost due north and a little to the west of Calcutta and three miles northeast of Santiniketan. The place is known as Kaṅkalitalla, and the *melā* was witnessed by the writer on the 13th of April 1952, the last day of the month Chaitra (March-April) of B. S. (Bangia Sakabda) 1358. In order to dispel at least one of the many misconceptions about the Indian mentality which the West has with respect to the Hindu lack of sense of time and history, it may be added that, in their reckoning, it was the year 5052 of the Kali Yuga, or the year 1,955,885,052 since the creation of the world. This is not an altogether irrelevant observation, as it should be remembered that in the events to be described presently we are dealing with remnants of the practices and ideas of an antiquity impossible to date which might also have some basis in astronomical facts and conventions.

There is no village where the *melā* is held every year. Kaṅkalitalla is in part jungle-covered, in part pastural to barren. It is a plot of ground by the side of a bend of the Kopai River above its confluence with the Bakreswar to form the Koiya. Its sacredness is derived from a *kuṇḍa,* that is, spring or well, said never to dry up even in the hottest weather. This water hole, roundish in circumference, is surrounded by shady trees and palms. Its banks descend rather steeply on three sides. The water level is approximately that of the river which, at its nearest point, is some 125 yards distant. The surrounding ground is hilly and rocky, and in some places swampy. There are no habitations except the adobe huts of some *saṁnyāsins.* Most of the year the place enjoys deep solitude except for occasional visitors or travelers along the meandering road

that passes through this section. The whole neighborhood is looked upon with awe and has the odor of sanctity and eeriness. People of Birbhum District speak with a hush about it. They tell of strange happenings, Tāntric rites, and ghosts which inhabit this region. In fact, the casual visitor will encounter blood-drenched patches of ground or may kick up a bone or human skull.

Kaṅkalitalla is, indeed, a place of skeletons beside a water hole. It is a burial ground rather than a burning *ghāṭ*. As such it is a holy place dedicated to the Mother Goddess, whose worship is both primitive and universal. Specifically, it is one of the 51 *pīṭhasthānas,* or places in India (and now Pakistan) where the limbs of Pārvatī, Śiva's consort, fell, according to an ancient story which is neither Vedic nor Purāṇic.[1] It is Āgamic or Tāntric.

Śiva, perhaps the most popular of all major deities of the Hindu pantheon, had as his wife the daughter of Dakṣa, a great sage and the favored son of the supreme God Brahma. Just as Śiva figures in the religious consciousness of India under many names, so his wife is known variously as Pārvatī, Umā, Bhavānī, Chandī, Kālī, Durgā, Mahāmāyā, and so forth. Particularly the last three are favorite names in Bengal. But in our story[2] she is Satī.

It seems that Dakṣa had little use for his son-in-law, who, perhaps lost in meditation and certainly not meaning harm, had not paid the respect due a father-in-law. When, therefore, Śiva alone of gods was not invited by Dakṣa to a great sacrifice he had instituted, Satī was much concerned and with the reluctant consent of her husband went to her father's house to inquire the reason. She was received coolly and submitted to hearing insults poured out on Śiva, her husband. This was too much for a loyal wife, and she forthwith jumped into the fire of the great sacrifice.

When Śiva heard of it, he not only mobilized his forces and destroyed Dakṣa and his sacrifice, but rescued the dead body of Satī. In utter dismay mingled with frenzied dreams inspired by her ravishing beauty, he

1. H. H. Wilson, *The Vishṇu Purāṇa*, vol. 4, p. 261, n. 2, and vol. 1, Preface, pp. 89-90, was among the first to call attention to the lack of allusion to the *pīṭhasthānas* in the Purāṇas.

2. Dramatically and with literary excellency retold by Rai Saheb Dinesh Chandra Sen, *Sati: A Mythological Story*. Translated from the original Bengali. Introduction by J. D. Anderson (Calcutta, 1916).

began wandering about the earth and the heavens with the lifeless but incomparably sweet burden. So absorbed was he in the wondrous form and so distraught that he was unconscious of the doings of Viṣṇu, one of the three principal godheads, who with his disk severed the bodily parts of Satī so that they fell down to earth—her beauteous neck in lovely Kashmir, her forehead near Karachi, her sparkling eardrops in Benares, her little finger at Kalighat in Calcutta, and her hipbone in the *kuṇḍa* of Kaṅkalitalla. When Śiva at last realized his sweet but sad burden had vanished in his arms, he withdrew from the world altogether to pass his existence in *samādhi*.

From a comparative religion point of view the story is somewhat reminiscent of fertility rites, while the analogy with the Isis and Osiris story, as mentioned already by H. H. Wilson, is certainly not the only one nor even perfect. The Indian story has both symbolic and perhaps philosophical elements in it which need to be explored. What is of interest to us is that Kaṅkalitalla *is* associated with the Mother Goddess. But the striking fact remains that both the ritual and the associations of the place have ramifications which reach out into almost every phase of Hindu religion and anthropology.

There cannot be any doubt that the predominant element in the activities and ideas associated with Kaṅkalitalla are Tāntric, as will appear from our description of the proceedings. Nevertheless, there are overtones and undertones of a nature not in agreement with the Tantras, so that it might almost serve as an object-lesson in the infinite complexity of the religious and social life of India, and Bengal in particular. The *mātrikā pūjā* is so firmly intrenched in Bengal that even the popular forms of Vaiṣṇavism and the manifestations in literature, as well as the poetry of a Rabindranath Tagore, are nothing but a vast doxology in praise of Woman. There is, thus, no essential contradiction between the primitive ritual being enacted in close propinquity to the centers of the reform tendencies even of a Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Keshub Chunder Sen, and Tagore himself, no matter how much they may be in disagreement with the rituals.

The raison d'être of the annual fair at Kaṅkalitalla is the sacrifice to Satī. At break of day, on April 13th, people from all over the Districts of Birbhum, Murshidabad, and Burdwan in Bengal, and from as far away as Bihar are beginning to converge on this place which was little

more than a wilderness a day or two before. They come on foot, by bicycle, or in oxcarts. Some may have been days in *yātrā* or pilgrimage. Old people, families, unattached children with the older brother setting the pace and all of them stopping here or there to pick a berry or a mango to supplement the rice or other food carried in their kerchief, Hindus of all castes, aborigines, make their way from every point of the compass so that the constant streams of pilgrims look like spokes of a wheel from an eminence nearby. Color, of course, is not lacking, occasioned by the *saris* and bundles carried which relieve the whiteness of the *dhotīs* and the blackness of the umbrellas which those on foot carry to protect themselves against the hot and glaring rays of the sun.

On their arrival in the vicinity of the *kuṇḍa* these pilgrims find a large number of hastily constructed bazaars with canvas roofs or tradesmen who have spread a piece of cloth on the ground and exhibit their goods which are neatly arranged, such as bangles, earrings, plastic combs, playthings, and what not. The stalls of itinerant merchants are laden with images and cheap prints of Durgā, primitive musical instruments, religious literature in Bengali, toys, and *sari* cloth. On some lots tin pots made of used gasoline cans and punched in pleasing patterns, or water jugs, sometimes of huge dimensions, are piled up six to ten feet high. The Doms or basket-makers, who are also drummers and cremators, exhibit their well-made but not too fancy baskets. Men, women, and children make their selections eagerly, either for personal use or to bring home a *pūjā* gift. Venders pass through the crowds with balloons, paper flowers and decorations, little boats made of paper, string, and pith. Others sell soft drinks of questionable ingredients or tempt the palate with rice or pulse dishes, fried potatoes, cooked and fried fish, chapatties, molasses and pan. But the greatest attraction are the stalls with huge platters of sweets, spiced cakes, and other delicacies of every description and color of which particularly Bengalis are fond. Milk, curds, and ghee may also be bought in quantity. A *nāgar-dola* or diminutive Ferris wheel with but four swings is also there for the delight of the children.

The atmosphere is solemn, even though the Santāl women, who belong to a smallish, dark yet well-built primitive race of Dravidian origin, are coquettish and display bright flowers in their hair, chattering and prattling in a lively fashion. After all, this is a place of pilgrimage. There are some shrines at which clouds of *dhuno* or incense greet the devotee who offers food or bright red petals to Durgā. As the sun grows hotter

toward mid-morning the crowds, now numbering many thousands, get thicker; balloons interfere with umbrellas, groups of drummers pass through the throng, recitations carry above the din. The bullock carts are parked almost in a circle at some distance from the water hole, and the animals rest or graze lazily in the parched patches of grass.

Each family or group of fellow pilgrims has, as it were, staked out a piece of ground for themselves, and now they are almost at the brink of the *kuṇḍa,* just leaving enough space for the half dozen or so mendicants and *saṁnyāsins* who squat there cross-legged, their Bengali and Sanskrit texts and other paraphernalia spread out before them. Toward one side of the *kuṇḍa* is a pavilion under which sit the priests who bless the flowers, boats, and other objects which are offered as a token at this or that shrine or cast into the *kuṇḍa.* There is chanting there and drumming and sprinkling of water. Our blanket is spread under a Jam tree, the cart and the bullocks are hard by. Having come very early we took possession of this choice plot, but now we are completely surrounded by other families with many children, dogs, draught animals, and carts. They politely refuse but eventually accept from our lunch. It seems not everyone observes the fast which normally precedes an event such as the one to be witnessed.

By now it has become difficult to move in the vicinity of the *kuṇḍa.* Respectfully a path is made for those men and women who measure the distance from the *tīrtha* or bathing place in the river to the *kuṇḍa* by prostrating themselves, marking each station with their fingernails in the hard soil. They, along with hundreds of others, had made their ablutions in the river, to return to it again after the completion of the ceremony or penance to wash off the dirt clinging to their bodies, or perhaps refresh themselves with the water available from wells which the Department of Health (which also maintained a free inoculating and vaccination station on the *melā* grounds) had sunk across the river on the beach and made safe with chemicals. The path down to the river is patrolled by Indian volunteer Boy Scouts who have strung a rope and now direct those going down to the shallow river to one side, those returning to the other.

The casual observer may have seen a number of goats among the throng or, if not careful, he may even have stumbled over stakes driven in the ground. If he had paid closer attention he would have noted that one or more of the menfolk in each group of pilgrims or each family

have arrived on the scene carrying goats in their arms. He might have watched the serious and devotional expression on their faces as they carried the animals as if they were the most precious thing on earth. He might have seen them making their way down to the river where they bathed them most carefully and lovingly. Without the *snāna* or ablution in the *tīrtha* they might not have considered their impending action as complete. The observer might also have seen them pass by the priests or *saṁnyāsins,* who sprinkled the animals with water from the *kuṇḍa* or daubed them with vermilion on the sawed-off horns.

These actions performed, the men would lead the goats back to the picnic grounds of their family, where they would tie them to a stake driven into the ground. Then one of them would take or pull from the cart a sacrificial post or *yuga-kaṣṭha,* such as is seen at Kalighat, but not so large. Not everyone of these posts was carved elaborately, but on the whole they conformed to the general description of a round or square butt end which was sunk into the ground, and an exposed end the lower part of which was carved and perhaps painted, and the upper part of which had the shape of a lyre, the two arms sometimes connected halfway up by a yoke. These posts were sunk into the ground in such a manner that the small side of the lyre-shaped part was facing the *kuṇḍa.* Occasionally a simple straight post took the place of such an elaborate one.

Black goats predominated, but there were also brown and pure white ones. Sheep were in the great minority. As the hours wore on the animals were carefully and almost reverently watched by those who did not join the multitudes in the bazaars. They also fed the goats.

Proudly the men would exhibit the machete-like knives which they had brought along, almost vying with each other to possess the most ornate and sharpest one. These knives, called *kharga* or *da,* were, on the average, thirty inches or more long, including the thin round wooden handle of eight inches which was brass-ringed and on which the heel of the blade was elaborately secured. The blade had roughly the shape of a swan's neck and head, gracefully curved, the part corresponding to the bill drawn out into a short but very pointed end which was properly sheathed. At the base the blade was approximately 3½ to 4 inches wide, at the part corresponding to the swan's head it may have been as wide as six inches. The men carried it usually with the blade up so that it would protrude far above their heads.

The great occasion of the *melā* was the sacrifice of the goats to Satī or the Mother Goddess, and the men owning the *kharga* were to act as priests. The crowd numbering many thousands became more restive as the sun climbed higher. They closed in on the ground around the *kuṇḍa* where the sacrificial posts had been set into the earth, not in a regular manner but at random, depending on what site the sacrificer had chosen. Around each post gradually a ring of people formed, and near high noon a commotion set in in the expectant crowd when an alert was given from the direction of the pavilion. The very air seemed to be vibrant and bristling. The goats were led to the sacrificial sites and the men took their stations. In about ten minutes the go-signal came from the same source, and what was now transacted was done with a speed and dexterity that baffled the imagination.

One man would seize the goat by its four legs, put its head into the lyre-shaped part of the post, while the man on the other side of the post would adjust the yoke to the goat's neck, take hold of the string around the goat's neck and pull hard. As each man would pull the neck became quite elongated, thus presenting an easy target for the man with the *kharga,* who was kneeling at right angles to the goat, facing the *kuṇḍa.* In a moment he lifted the knife with both hands above his head and came down on the goat's neck in a great swoop, severing it with the curved part of the blade. A great shout of *Mahāmāyā* went up at the same time, thus calling upon the great Mother of the Universe. Water from the *kuṇḍa* was touched to the lips of the goat to consecrate it.

It took but seconds, it seemed, to ready each of the goats for the sacrifice. The same clean sweep of the blade and the thunderous shout. At each post an average of five to ten goats were thus sacrificed, but in about ten minutes the whole ritual was over, thousands of goats and sheep having been sacrificed in this time. If the head was not severed in one blow or if the blade missed the neck entirely, as happened in a few cases, no doubt owing to nervousness, it was taken as an ill omen and that the sacrifice was not acceptable to the goddess. However, at the next blow the goat was dispatched. The bodies were tied to sticks carried on the shoulders of the men, who walked back to their carts or to their villages; the heads were tied together and carried in hand. Those who had not brought their own goats were eager to purchase or be given a head. The posts were pulled up, the *kẖargas* cleaned, and by late afternoon only the blood-stained soil around shallow holes was all the evidence of a

great sacrifice. However, as the bullock carts, bicycles, and pedestrians were moving home from Kaṅkalitalla, the Santāl people and others made their way in the opposite direction to join those who had stayed behind to amuse themselves or stage their dances far into the night to the accompaniment of drums and pipes.

It would require a lengthy dissertation to analyze and explain the various elements in this yearly episode, when ten thousand or more people converge as it were from nowhere on a spot believed haunted and for the most part deserted. However, the main outlines are clear. Although animal sacrifice was controversial even in Vedic times, it is, from the point of view of *ahiṁsa* as preached by many Hindu beliefs and organizations, as indefensible as from other humanitarian considerations. However, if witnessed at such a time when the whole atmosphere seems charged with solemnity, it does not seem the horrible spectacle which even those condemn who have not the least objection to abattoirs. At least, in this case, there attaches no commercial motive to it. They will partake of the meat as will the Occidental of his Easter lamb.

The occasion was not so much the desire to propitiate the Great Mother Goddess of the Universe, the Mahāmāyā, as it was to do honor to her. The reverential mien of everyone gave definite proof of the deep faith in an exalted being in whose hands man's destiny lies. These people thought of her as Satī also, the perfect wife who rather dies than hear her husband reviled. Those more philosophical thought of Pārvatī as the counterpart of Śiva, the great god, who, deprived of that *alter ego* whose creation was the very reason for the existence of the universe, withdraws into his own Oneness. They might even have taken it symptomatic of the world process, in which duality is ultimately reduced to unity at the expense of the multifarious world. In sustaining the *śakti* or power of the universe to create and energize, a thing inconceivable without polarity as symbolized in Śiva and Śakti, the world is assured in its present order.

Of course we know that the goat is the Hindu symbol of lust; also that the whole ritual reminds one strongly of the idea of the scapegoat, especially since the sacrifice occurs prior to the first day of the new year. We will not deny, therefore, that the element of sacrificing one's appetites and lower urges to Satī, the pure and shining perfection of womanhood, also enters the mind of the devotee. It was not a perfect exposition of a

Bhairavī Durgā or Kālī sacrifice, since a black goat certainly would have been the appropriate offering to her, not a white one or even a sheep.

Furthermore, this was a virtually priestless function, the men owning the *khargas* acting as priests. It has all the earmarks of a most primitive feast or even aboriginal ritual spontaneously conceived and executed by the people. The fact that Kaṅkalitalla is a Tāntric place lends further credence to this hypothesis. The tolerance of the Tāntrics is well known. No distinction of caste or sex even is made by them in their rituals. Yet, even at that, the ritual itself was not purely Tāntric, for Tāntric rites are nocturnal and certainly not public. Animal sacrifices by decapitation, *bali-dānas,* are beyond a doubt also Tāntric.[3] It is not Vedic, but has long been practiced by several castes, notably the Jadupetiās and others living in this part of Bengal. On the whole it is quite consonant with Mother Goddess worship, which goes back to a hoary antiquity.

That *melā* and sacrifice at Kaṅkalitalla are folk survivals of a dim past in which the story of Satī, reputedly a Tāntric creation, is not altogether the determining element, may be gathered from the accompanying events to which we shall now turn our attention.

Prior to the sacrifice, in fact all during the period of arrival of the pilgrims, the *kuṇḍa* or sacred well which is supposed to enshrine the hipbone of Satī, was the scene of many devotions. Sticks with triangular red flags were stuck everywhere in the soft ground, and paper garlands were stretched between them. Early in the morning the still water reflected the lovely trees and palms on its bank and fallen leaves drifted slowly along its rim. But during the course of the forenoon hundreds of people would walk to the edge of the pond where the bank was on an easy incline and throw sweets and flowers into the water, all the while performing their *namaskāras* or devotions. The little boats already referred to had been bought in great numbers for an anna or two, and by noon a huge fleet of these gaily colored boats with little flags was sailing the pond. No doubt this had the Plutonian significance of insuring safe passage of the soul beyond Yama or death. In this connection it ought to be mentioned that the Bāgdī, who are a lower caste of West Bengal that fur-

3. In this connection cf. the Rudhirādhyāya in the Kālikā Purāṇa. The goat sacrifice is an ancient institution. Cf. Rao Bahadur Gopalrao Hari Deshmukh, "On Hindu Sacrifices," in *The Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay,* vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 106-18.

nishes fishermen, cultivators, and menials, do worship Yama and, no doubt, Yamī, his female aspect which is associated also with Satī.

Again, all during the day, under cover of a roof, a wandering minstrel recited, as he will at any *melā,* the Rāmāyaṇa. The melodic flow of this narrative related in Bengali was accentuated in its highlights by the beating of drums on the part of his assistant. Only a short while before, the Rāmanavamī, the birthday of Rāma, had been celebrated by his devotees. And part of this story too had to do with the trials and tribulations of a divine couple and the devotion of a loving wife.

Several times two boys dressed as the boy Kṛṣṇa would, in the company of drummers, circumambulate the *kuṇḍa,* dancing and collecting coins for religious purposes. Perhaps there was a sprinkling of Mahāshayas present at the *melā,* who believe all men to be Kṛṣṇas and all women Rādhās.

The *saṁnyāsins* living in the neighborhood had open house, as it were, and their *celas* were busy ushering devotees into their presence whom they would bless and recite *mantras* to, and perhaps discuss religious and philosophical matters with. One in particular, though he did not speak English, expressed a desire to visit America, and voiced his belief that, contrary to popular opinion, America possessed a deep spirituality also. Other *saṁnyāsins,* definitely Tāntrics, were more retiring, sitting in meditation upon skulls, the door posts draped with skulls. It would seem that they did not take any active part in the affairs at the *melā.*

A number of other manifestations of Mother worship and Śāktism were also observed. To a Śākta, the female aspect of the universe takes precedence over the male aspect, and he is, therefore, committed to *mātrikā pūjā,* or adoration of the Mother Goddess, who might be any or all of the consorts of the gods in the Hindu pantheon. Even if his particular Devī did not have the sanction of either Vedic or Āgamic literature, the believer in Śakti or the female energy of Śiva would have invented her. To him the universe is a manifestation of power or energy, however much the Vedāntin may insist on it being nothing but *māyā.*

Worship of the Great Mother was never so standardized as that of other deities. There is a spontaneity and individuality about it which is in striking contrast to the Vedic ritual, for instance. There is no liturgy, no written record of procedure; it is a literally down-to-earth affair which is as old as man's power to conceive an analogy between the crea-

tive urges and powers of man and the manifestations of growth and creation in the universe at large. It is perhaps futile to make a distinction in these matters between Aryan and aboriginal practices and religious mentality. The entire performance at Kaṅkalitalla was a demonstration of a powerful urge to pay homage to the universal *śakti,* to return in the sacrifice of the goat that life which originally flowed from the abundance of the lap of the Great Mother, to dispose her at the beginning of the new year to let it pour forth again in all its exuberance, and to reaffirm and undergird the belief that she *is śakti,* energy and life, all appearance of death to the contrary. Moreover, perhaps faintly realizing the momentous implications of Śiva's retirement from the affairs of the world and that the only token of his creative power and energy are those parts of Satī's body which Viṣṇu, with forethought and from a desire to preserve this world, had Śiva drop from his arms, the people cling with all their might to such tangible proofs as the *kuṇḍa* and such tangible symbols as the sacrifice. There is a deep philosophy and metaphysics here buried under a jungle of imagery.

That such elemental and dimly conscious ideas were in the minds of the masses was demonstrated by the popularity which a small shrine near the edge of the embankment of the *kuṇḍa* enjoyed. It was a rather low block or mound, *bedi,* smeared over with vermilion and poured over with rice water and paste, on which the worshippers scattered sweets and flowers as their *dāna.* It was the shrine of Manasā, a snake deity, worshipped under a gnarly tree. In this worship even others than those belonging entirely to the Hindu persuasion, such as the Jadupetiās, take part. While reeking of the animistic, it yet fits into the whole picture of *mātrikā pūjā* which, in this primitive stage, has as only paraphernalia a low mound of earth, with or without knobs of colored clay on it, and a flag in front of it. In the villages of the Santāls you invariably see a similar, perhaps rectangular, mound with a twig stuck in on one end which bears a few leaves near the top.

The popularity of the annual *melā* at Kaṅkalitalla, saturated as it is with animistic, Tāntric, Śāktic, and similar elements bears testimony to the fact that the worship of the Great Mother is firmly rooted in Bengal society of all strata. The prediction of H. H. Wilson, made long ago, that the Hindu festivals will diminish both in frequency and attraction may surely be fulfilled, looking at the trend of modern India; but it remains doubtful with respect to this most ancient worship and religion.

We can say this because what manifests itself in the sacrifice described has its equivalent elements on a higher or more intellectual level in some forms of Vaiṣṇavism and, as has already been intimated, in the poetry of a Tagore. Whether this or that or any ritual is approved by these highest intellectual representatives of Hinduism, is immaterial. The female aspect of the universe is integrally built into the psyche of Bengal and will never be dissociated from its social and religious as well as esthetic life. The *yātrās* or pilgrimages may become fewer, but their basic motivation will sublimate itself in a more spiritual, poetic, and metaphysical conception of the female principle in the universe.

HĪNAYĀNA AND RELIGIOUS PARADOX: A REVIEW-ARTICLE*

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SOUTHERN BUDDHISM has been both a problem and a luxury for the science of comparative religion—a problem because it seems to make unique demands on the definition of religion, a luxury because the unique is always a luxury for a science. Not many have seriously addressed themselves to the task of denying this uniqueness, even in part; we can be thankful that the Professor of Systematic Theology of McGill University has done so, and done it well, at least in so far as Burma is concerned. We can also be thankful that his discussion leads him on into a realm not usually associated with Hīnayāna at all, that of the religious function of paradox.

Is Burmese Buddhism a religion in any reasonably full sense of the word? Out of Dr. Slater's sixteen years in the Orient and his acquaintance with relevant literature Western, Pali, and Burmese comes an affirmative answer quite unequivocal. He marshals firsthand accounts of discussions with Burmese of all levels, personal observations, legendary material, scholarly publications, and Burmese educational materials, to show the Buddhism of that country as a buoyant, positive, individual, ethical religion. It emerges from his discussion a living tradition of serious striving after Nirvana (serious, though not always strenuous), a religion whose animistic elements are mainly those which have been absorbed into or dominated by Buddhism, whose communities are closely in touch with their monasteries, whose festivals are oriented toward Buddhist values, and whose monks are often respected exemplars of popularly held ideals.

Most important for his study is the notion of Nibbāna or Nirvana. Nirvana is a vague but persistent term, he points out. It is inescapable in Buddhism, and dominating. It is an affirmation and a denial, it is confounding; it is nevertheless "a consolidating, consummating term . . . Nibbana is the *gospel* of Buddhism. . . . It is the term which turns

* Robert Lawson Slater, *Paradox and Nirvana, a study of religious ultimates with special reference to Burmese Buddhism.* Chicago University Press, 1951. xii, 145 pp. $4.00.

pessimism into optimism . . ., it is the term which makes it true to say that Buddhism *IS* a religion—not merely an ethic or a philosophy."[1] It is Nirvana which lends religious meaning to ethical endeavor, to intellectual analysis, to Dharma and Saṁgha. Not knowable except by insight, it "eludes philosophy while it inspires life." It is as such a term that it appears and functions, at least in Burmese Buddhism.

Nirvana, as a consummating and necessary term, yet one expressible only in a painful tension between negation and affirmation, becomes thus the focal point of the study. The Pali scriptures show it to be affirmative; it is the content of a revelation or a discovery, the content of a gospel, declared with certitude, expressed in terms of perfection, known in enlightenment. Yet it is also declared to be nothing intelligible, nowise analogous to any existent, not an *object* of enlightenment so much as enlightenment itself, expressed more truly in negation than in any affirmation. Dr. Slater contends that there is here not so much a denial of the adequacy of the intellect as of its relevance, and that this denial of relevance shows the denials of soul and survival to be similar denials of relevance, and in their turn paradoxical affirmations of the religious nature of the context, Nirvana, which gives them their religious meaning. Expression here "belongs to the language of faith. The negative terms employed are just as much an affirmation of this faith as the associated picture-terms of analogy which are more obviously positive" (p. 82).

After he has gone on to show that this paradoxical nature of expression pertains to the ultimate throughout Mahāyāna also, whether as Nirvana or Suchness, he develops his key idea of an *ultimate religious term*. Basic to a religion, he believes, lie individual religious apprehensions, which cloak themselves in notions which are at least quasi-imaginative, and which in turn may express themselves in art, myth, ritual, or concept. If the last of these, the resultant concept symbolizes more than discursive language can express, and a *religious term* is born. Such a term is an *ultimate religious term,* i. e., a term which "completes doctrine and is the goal of religious aspiration and discipline" (p. 91), if it is central, unifying, and focussing for its particular religious tradition. In asserting the denotability of the ultimate while denying its connotability, such a term protects its *locus* in experience, the particular insight

1. P. 63 (italics his).

in which its denotation is given, from confusion with the loci of terms conceptually similar but derived from different experiences (pp. 86, 91). Thus only those who attain the locus know the referend of the term, though for those yet on their way it is ultimate and determining as a referent.

The various religions supply Dr. Slater with further examples of ultimate religious terms. Under scrutiny, Hinduism presents *Brahman-ātman,* which remains paradoxical despite the attempts of philosophers to make either the negation or the affirmation final (p. 95). Hebrew religion, too, presents God in contrary aspects, as revealed yet unknowable, near yet distant (p. 100). Plato's theology and those of Christians from St. Paul to Bishop Aulén supply further paradoxical characterizations of the ultimate.

The book closes with three stimulating suggestions: (1) That religious paradox intimates that in at least one area of expression, formulation in an imaginative opposition is final and necessary; (2) that paradox is not the midpoint in the supercession of myth by philosophy, but a denial of the adequacy of the latter—"As against primitive Myth, it insists that the ultimate religious term is beyond familiarity; as against logic, it insists that it is beyond definition" (p. 18); (3) that the paradoxes refer each to some experience of "the Abyss," but not necessarily to an identical experience in each case.

Most of the problems which might arise out of the discussion are met or at least anticipated therein. With regard to either his conclusions or his argument regarding the religious nature of Burmese Theravāda one can hardly raise an issue, nor can it be denied that he is convincing in showing that the approach to Buddhism through the concept of Nirvana is most illuminating. It is his concept of "ultimate religious term" that raises the real difficulty. He holds that religious notions may express themselves as art, ritual, myth, or concept, but that he is considering concepts, or "terms." Does this mean that there is some kind of one-to-one relationship between apprehensions, notions, and terms, so that for an apprehension of the ultimate there would be but one notion, and for that notion but one term? A multiplicity of terms for the same notion, it might be granted, would tend to coalesce, were the functioning of religious expression in quasi-concepts independent of art, ritual, and myth, but where these all interact and cross-fertilize one another in the struggle for expression, how can there be the presumption that any one

term, or any group of terms, is "ultimate"? Does not the ultimacy lie somewhere in the region where terms shade off not only into one another but into the other modes of expression?

Three examples may illustrate this. In Buddhism, for instance, is there so complete a priority of Nirvana over Buddha as Dr. Slater seems to imply? Does not the symbol of the Buddha in a sense denote, along with its historical reference, the same apprehension as does Nirvana, while representing, in its own right, a different notion of the same? It seems very difficult to account for the development, in Mahāyāna, of Buddha as Tathāgatha, unless the Buddhist experience informs the Buddha symbol with something of the ultimate to which the Nirvana symbol is in some way inadequate.

An analogous problem arises for Christianity as soon as the possibility of a devotionally satisfactory Christocentric theology is admitted (Dr. Slater may make no such admission). Indeed, the Trinity itself asserts, if we follow the language of devotion at least, not only three loci of the ultimate but an independent and paradoxical ultimacy of what is given in each. There are good reasons why Dr. Slater omitted this problem from the study at hand which, after all, grew out of his doctoral research, but even an awareness of it would seem to have required modification of his discussion.

The third example is more oblique, and grows out of the fact that Hinduism contains more than the Upaniṣads and the Gītā. It is a pity that the Vedānta tradition so readily presents itself as the representative of Hinduism for such a study as this, though it does so with very good right. Had Dr. Slater touched upon the problems of paradoxical religious expression in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, for instance, he might not have changed his thesis, but he would at least have met a very interesting anomaly: while the most clearly paradoxical term, the one which provides "the goal of aspiration," is *apavarga* or release, religious feeling is hardly apparent, except as directed toward Śiva or Viṣṇu. Though both of these are treated paradoxically, their ultimacy is denied by the system, and they are not significantly connected, except externally, with *apavarga*.[2] The god presents his own paradoxes, and his relation to *apavarga* may be paradoxical, but there seems no indication that the two function as a single ultimate term in any way. It may be that we

2. See *Nyāyasūtra* i. l. 22; *Nyāyabhāṣya ad. loc.* and iv. l. 21, 60; *Nyāyakandalī;* and the colophons throughout the works of the school, particularly in *Nyāyakusumāñjali.*

have here a case of the religious death (with philosophical embalming) of one term—*apavarga*—and the appearing of another as ultimate. Chaitānya, the Naiyāyika who sought *ānanda* with Rāma rather than to be "like a stone" in *apavarga,* would not then be quite so surprising a figure. Yet such a process of the replacement of one religious term by another is much more understandable if the single term is not required to bear the full weight of the religious character of the tradition.

These three instances illustrate a difficulty that could be avoided by a little less static conception of "religious term." Such terms, it would seem, manifest themselves not apart from myth, but in myth—that is, in, or in connection with, some narrative formulation, with drama breaking through the logic of discursive language as also does poetry, and having its own necessary part to play in the illumination of life, especially the life of intuition. In Christianity, God is not just the Abyss-and-the-Most-Real, but the "Abyss-and-the-Most-Real which was in Christ and is in the Church," as the deep-seated rejection of the extreme mystics, within the worshiping Church, shows. Similarly, Nirvana may not be the ultimate term of Buddhism apart from Buddha and possibly even Dharma and Saṁgha and, in Mahāyāna, the compassion of the Bodhisattvas, all of which contribute to the myth which denotes the ultimate, and which provide Nirvana not merely with connotative content for paradoxical expression, but with its very ability to have an ultimate reference at all.

Within this framework, it may be suggested that the religious inadequacies of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were not the philosophic difficulties pointed out by Śaṅkarācārya and others, but the inability of its analytic and highly conceptual methods to establish a successful linkage, whether paradoxical or narrative, between what appear to be two conflicting claimants to ultimacy, whose "terms" were taken too narrowly.

One might mention that W. T. Stace's recent book on a related subject[3] shows that Dr. Slater is not only not alone in treating the quasi-conceptual static paradox as separable from the rather different type of paradox embodied in narrative myth, but that he is a very mild instance among the tempted. The merits of his work are so numerous that the criticism here outlined cannot but seem tendentious. Other critical remarks would have to be directed rather to the German printers' not in-

3. *Time and Eternity* (Princeton University Press, 1952).

frequent misprints, with even these finding an ample treasury of merit laid up to cover them in the richness of the appendices and the convenience of the bibliography.[4] Dr. Slater's readers should certainly find themselves recurrently in his debt.

4. Which might well have included S. N. Dasgupta's critical essay on Stcherbatskoi and de la Vallée Poussin, "Some Aspects of Buddhist Philosophy," in his *Philosophical Essays* (Calcutta: University Press, 1941).

MR. STACE AT THE INTERSECTION OF TIME AND ETERNITY: A REVIEW-ARTICLE*

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NOTHING HAS DATED more rapidly than the warfare between science and theology which, at the turn of the century, still was a vigorous one. This is not to say that the war was useless, for the criticism that regards religious assertions as if they were scientific ones springs itself from the existence of theologies that understand religious symbols in a literal way. But the decisive turn came when attention was directed to concrete and examinable phenomena, to religious experience and operations, and when it was seen that the materials for understanding embodied in religious myth are not tapped by those who take the myth as a discursive description. The book that deserves to rank as a classic, though perhaps not widely recognized as such, in terminating the warfare between science and religion by transcending it is George Santayana's *Reason in Religion,* a book superior in certain crucial respects to William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* in which medical materialism sometimes easily merges with a not so opposite materialist supernaturalism.

Mr. Stace's new book on the philosophy of religion, *Time and Eternity,* seems in the line of thought of which Santayana is a major representative. He rejects the whole tradition which regards God as a quasi-physical being, tries to prove his existence by quasi-physical proofs, and derives from him physical effects, cures, and miracles. Mr. Stace even goes so far as to say that the very conception of God is not essential to religion and that religious experience, not belief, provides the basic subject-matter of analysis. Mr. Stace distinguishes between the literal and the symbolic use of language and says that when religious propositions are treated as literal ones, science will always be the winner in the end.

Up to this point Mr. Stace seems to move in the orbit of the contemporary naturalist interpretation of religion which, unlike nineteenth century materialism, does not deny the existence of the supernatural, but

* W. T. Stace, *Time and Eternity.* Princeton University Press, 1952. vii, 169 pp. $3.00.

regards the supernatural as a natural fact, and like other natural facts not fully known. But Mr. Stace's position differs from that of naturalism, and the difference comes to a focus in his conception of religious symbolism. His view is that, while non-religious symbols are at least potentially capable of being translated into literal language, religious symbols, because of the nature of their referents, cannot be so translated. The religious is the "utterly other." Contradictions, alternatingly positive and negative conceptions, are only feeble approximations in expressing the numinous. Mr. Stace quotes from T. S. Eliot: "To apprehend/The point of intersection of the timeless/With time is an occupation for the saint." He seems to be less concerned with the ontological question of the nature of the divine reality than with the epistemological question of how it is known. This knowledge he derives, in the manner of epistemological dualism, from "intuition." Religious symbolism, it turns out, is the outer side of intuition, which alone gives access to religious reality and reveals a world in which all movement and difference has ceased, transcending the perspective of the natural world in which God appears as separate from the world or one mystic separate from the other.

It needs no stressing that a man of Mr. Stace's stature defends his views with explicit and well-developed arguments and that he has many illuminating things to say on traditional religious topics, as, for instance, in his discussion of the negative divine, which he divests of much obscurity and whose complementariness to the positive divine he stresses. One may, therefore, dispense with the compliments one might pay to a lesser book and do it the real honor of discussing its argument. Mr. Stace's book, as all good discussions of religion, is informed by the desire not to let truths slip by, leave experiences out of account because of preconceived intellectual schemes. But what exactly is the manner by which one is to get at these neglected truths? Much that is symbolized in religious language or rite has for long periods lain outside the purview of science. Before the arrival, for instance, of the psychologies of the unconscious, a careful empiricism found it difficult to find the existential referents of such terms as soul, oversoul, or noumenal self. Mr. Stace speaks in passing of the correction religion may receive from psychology and sociology, analogous to the correction it received from the natural sciences. But much of what he says in his book is evidence of the correction religion already *has* received from psychology and social

science. When Mr. Stace speaks of intuition, his tendency is to say that the knowledge it conveys comes from "below." The references to the "subconscious" sources of religious insight are frequent. It needs no reminder that the traditional metaphor referring to the divine is "above." The shift in terminology from "oversoul" to "subconscious" exactly marks the change of perspective due to our increased knowledge of what is beyond the conscious self. There is no denying that this path, when pursued to its ultimate end, leads to the dissolution of the religious mystery. As has already been implied, to such dissolution Mr. Stace cannot agree. To him the divine is mysterious in essence, not by any temporary or permanent shortcomings of the human intellect. Mr. Stace goes so far as to admit natural causal conditions of religious states, even their dependence on bodily organs. Yet to him there is "that other half of the truth which naturalism misses," the truth given, whatever its genesis, in intuition and only in intuition. In reading his book for the second time there emerges behind the sophistication of his argument a quite simple fundamental belief, much akin to the traditional division of faith and reason. Reason gives us our ordinary world in laborious complexity. Faith gives us this world miraculously transformed and supplemented by another one. This other world, as Mr. Stace stresses, is really beyond expression in concepts, but of opposing terms the axiologically higher ones, such as love or wisdom, may with greater accuracy be applied to it. He distinguishes two orders of being, two ways of knowing. Naturalism is only half of the truth, and to concentrate on it alone would, at least for philosophy, seem to be equivalent to error. Mr. Stace does not choose to rest his case on the evidence of some privileged experience of a few mystics. He chooses the more difficult path by insisting that intuition is a capacity shared by all men, though activation of it is a matter of degree.

What is the evidence for Mr. Stace's assertion of the divine mystery? There is an obvious sense in which one can speak of mystery. This lies in the inevitable tentativeness and only temporary acceptability of any comprehensive explanatory scheme. The prophet is always right who predicts that today's knowledge will be outdated tomorrow. Such sense of mystery is a methodological wariness in regard to all theory shared by all good investigators. But to speak of mystery in this way is to speak the language of intellect, and, according to Mr. Stace, the function of intuition is to achieve the peace that passes all intellectual understand-

ing and sees mystery and contradictoriness not as intellectual limitations but as the very essence of the divine depth. Nevertheless, intuition is expressed to us in discursive language. Mr. Stace is well aware of this difficulty and he goes so far as to suggest that it would be best for the mystic to be silent, because the moment he *speaks,* he must distort his vision. Such a notion of the relation of intuition and intellect permits an almost unlimited elusiveness with regard to the contents of intuition. But what is the warrant for the distinction? Mr. Stace sees it in experience. But unless one assumes antecedently two orders of experience, or two orders of evidence, the experience referred to by the name of intuition cannot, without begging the question, be assigned to a different order of existence. The distinction of orders of existence derives from interpretation, not experience. Interpretation, as we shall show, seems to warrant no existential dualism in dealing with the facts designated by "intuition."

The question must further be raised whether the basic distinctions of Mr. Stace's system, such as the notion of the "intersection" of time and eternity derive from intuition or intellect. If from the former, they are metaphorical, and the system becomes hazy. If from the latter, the power of intellect would seem to receive an undue extension, undue in terms of Mr. Stace's conception of intellect. The division between intuition and intellect, moreover, suffers from many internal difficulties. Intuition has been made a mode of knowing so wholly different from intellect that it is difficult to see how the results of the one could be intelligible or relevant to the other, and the being who moves from the one to the other seems to become two beings who cannot communicate with each other. How can the mystic speaking ever *speak* about his mystic experience, or remember it, which is a sort of speaking too?

The notion of intuition seems to be vindicated by the alleged existence of the irrational. The belief that "irrational" is an existential, rather than an epistemic term is widespread. Yet all the evidence shows that the "irrational" is due to the intersection and temporary incompatibility of several schemes of interpretation where it is not simply the unexplained. A symbol that is full of contradictions may have great value if it refers to conflicting tendencies in nature or conflicting motivations in the human soul. But its contradictions mark the problem, not its solution, though one may incidentally glory in its depths. To make the distinction between the symbolic and the literal, but to take the symbolic

as referring to a different order of being is only a more sophisticated version of literalism.

Though "intuition" is ultimately ineffable, Mr. Stace, like all other writers on the subject, proceeds to tell us about its contents, though of course he wishes what he says to be taken as an approximation. Now what he thus puts into words seems to be capable of a wholly naturalistic interpretation. His "eternity" is peopled with the same symbols which are familiar to us from dreams and poetry and whose reference to the natural world a whole school of writers has recently been busy explaining. At other places "eternity" has a more intellectualist character. The time that comes to a stop in eternity is, in some respects, nothing more mysterious than our natural capacity to abstract from personal fortune such eternity as there is, for instance, in the thought of an eventual molecular equilibrium in which life and men with all hopes, desires, and fears will be as nothing. When Mr. Stace refers to the religious as the "utterly other," it may be a plausible explanation that what he refers to is contact made with a repressed part of the self, rather than another order of reality. A recent writer has referred to the language of our dreams as the "forgotten language," forgotten for our waking self because we isolate one part of the self against the other. The "utterly other" perhaps should rather be called the unrecognized self. Any particular interpretation, such as the ones here suggested, is of course debatable, but there seems to be little reason to deny that mystery ultimately has as natural a referent as miracle has a natural cause. There seems to be no satisfactory evidence which would require us to understand the materials of intuition as anything else but natural subject-matter.

George Santayana, at the end of *Reason in Science,* speaks of the "unexplored jungles and monster-breeding lairs within our nominal jurisdiction which it is the immediate task of science to clear." Anyone exploring the internal jungle of the soul will experience a keen sympathy with religion, finding in it, too, an awareness that man is not simply a dull, utilitarian beast of burden—though religion, when it turns to asceticism or regimentation, has done its share in depressing the human self. Still, the weight of external reality and repressive education has kept most men from a sufficient awareness of their internal resources. Impulse is allowed only oblique expression in outer symbol. In ancient or modern romances, people's excitement is stirred by tales of shipwreck,

murder, or persecution, and yet these are only re-ified symbols of the soul's migrations. Men travel across the seas while they are really trying to accomplish a journey into the self. Under such conditions religion, too, has tended towards physicalist language. The choice of symbol for those who can translate is no great matter. But a literal understanding of religion is a great matter precisely because it prevents the meaning of the symbol from being brought to adequate awareness.

Mr. Stace is peculiarly ambiguous on this issue. He says that we should move our understanding of religion to the symbolic plane. In part this seems to mean to him wresting its secret from the metaphor. But, in part, moving things to the symbolic plane seems to mean an insurance against the scientific criticism of beliefs and emotions that one finds oneself clinging to in spite of science, or better knowledge. "Remove the battle to the ground of the symbolical interpretation and the sceptic is without a weapon." There is, in this respect, a certain resemblance between Mr. Stace and Mr. Niebuhr. A high sophistication that leaves no relevant argument undiscussed overlays a foundation of naïve belief. Mr. Niebuhr's is a way of having the cake of intellectuality and eating the fillings of unanalyzed emotion. Mr. Stace seems to be more undecided. He seems to be truly at the intersection of time and eternity, at the intersection of a symbolic and a literal understanding of religion. If he but follows the implications of half of his thought, he will see that naturalism does not miss "half of the truth," but rather is eager to see that the other half of reality be brought into truth, too, and not be handed over to a mode of thinking in which contradictions are an achievement to be topped only by silence.

Philosophy of religion seems to be caught in a vise when determining the subject matter of religion. It can assume that non-natural (supernatural) objects are its proper domain, but this, beside all other difficulties, seems to make religion a sort of physics, perhaps a superphysics. If the natural is considered the subject matter of religion, it has a tendency to vanish and be absorbed by other fields, such as medicine, astronomy, geology, etc. The apparently simple attempt to locate the religious in experience has not yet yielded any precise referent. Mr. Stace, though he says that not religious belief, but religious experience is essential, has a good deal more to say on the various religious beliefs of literate cultures than on experience. William James's *The Varieties of Religious Experi-*

ence tends to be what various men have said about their experience. James, in this book, is insufficiently aware that the statements of experience contain a good deal of *interpretation* and does not sufficiently penetrate to the core of the experience itself.

The first problem of contemporary philosophy of religion is, therefore, that it is no easy matter to find its very subject matter. Add to this that we have come to speak with a certain legitimacy of the "religion of nationalism" or the "religion of communism" and one sees that an examination of religion transcends the study of the traditional creeds and churches alone. Moreover, while the concept of religion on the one side tends to widen, even to the extent of including, in the view of some, "secularism" as a particular religious creed, it narrows on the other side if one regards certain aspects of religious institutions as political rather than religious in character. But on this question debate rages too. Defenses of the political as religious are still very much the order of the day. Moreover, if one considers that to philosophy, the traditional critic and often adversary of religion, there have come psychology and sociology exercising similar functions, the uncertainties into which discussions of religion have been thrown become very understandable.

One major conception of religion that emerges from philosophy sees its function as one of integrating all of human life towards a comprehensive, inclusive, and harmonious purpose that does justice to all aspects of the self. The relegation of religion to an intermittent ceremony or the suppression of some vital faculty in the name of religion seem to be inconsistent with such a conception. Yet such is often the case in reality. Religion is thus challenged both in concept and in practice. The question has been raised more than once what will remain of religion once the art of healing has fully come under the auspices of medicine, the satisfaction of knowing under the various sciences; once magic has definitively been discarded as pseudo-technology and pseudo-psychology. These are all perplexing problems to which the philosophy of religion must address itself, an endeavor in which it is as difficult to forswear cherished beliefs as it is to keep one's sight on the relevant facts.

Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'extase. By MIRCEA ELIADE. Paris: Payot, 1951. 447 pp. 1300 fr.

The author is well known through his numerous books and articles on religious and mythological subjects. In all of them he has shown us his extraordinary erudition and, what is still more admirable, his penetrating thought. His works are never limited to a simple description of facts. They always contain a keen analysis followed by synthesis. The present book has the same qualities. It is certainly the best work on shamanism published so far.

His previous researches on yoga practice have led the author to the phenomenon of shamanism, which he considers to be of the same nature, though more primitive, as the mystical experiences known elsewhere. Already in 1946 the author had published an article[1] in which he rightly opposed Åke Ohlmarks'[2] explanation of shamanism as wholly derived from the typical mental disease known as "arctic hysteria," showing that a whole cosmographic system and an entire theory of the universe are inseparable from shamanism. His present book develops these views and insists on the mystical experiences and initiations entirely similar to those, better known, of higher civilizations.

The author acknowledges the possibility of Oriental (especially Iranian) influences in the representations of the Siberian shaman's initiation (climbing the steps of a ladder to ascend to heaven, etc.), but he is not primarily interested in the history of such possible influences. What is more important to him is to explain the meaning of the religious phenomenon. On the other hand, he does not limit his study to the Siberian data which provided the term "shaman," but extends it to similar manifestations of ecstatic experiences in North and South America, Oceania, and Indonesia. Several chapters are devoted to comparisons with India, other Indo-European peoples, Tibet, and China.

Mr. Eliade rightly insists on two points. First, the term shamanism does not apply to the entire religion of the peoples concerned. The shaman is a specialist who partakes of this religion, but does not represent the whole of it. His ecstatic experiences evolve in the general frame of the given religion, but distinguish themselves by their in-

1. "Le Problème du Chamanisme," in *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, vol. CXXXI.
2. *Studien zum Problem des Schamanismus* (Lund-Kopenhagen, 1939).

tensity. Second, mentally abnormal or not, the shaman has to undergo a training, an initiation. A simple hysteric is not a shaman. He may become such a specialist through learning and mastering certain technics. But in this case he is cured from his disease (p. 40).

The author is particularly interested in the important aspects of the initiation rites which consist mostly in a symbolic death followed by a resurrection (pp. 66 f.). Other features are declared, perhaps too quickly, not to be original (hereditary transmission of the shaman's power, change of sex, presence of female divinities). This position is due to the author's resolutely idealistic standpoint, which is apparent throughout his book and determines, of course, the way the facts are presented. For example (p. 204), the mystic ecstasy, purely spiritual, is prior to the trance provoked by certain poisons or drugs; (p. 371) the author shows that he is very conscious of the seriousness of his position: were the purely spiritual forms debased or were the material forms spiritualized? He certainly prefers the first alternative (see p. 395, where the apotheosis of heroes is presented as a debased form of the magical fly, "dégradation d'un symbole," as Mr. Eliade puts it).

Though it seems indispensable to underline this standpoint of the author, and though one may feel the necessity of re-examining a certain number of statements, this in no way minimizes the value of the present book. The facts are well described and the comparisons full of interesting suggestions. Due attention is drawn to every aspect of the problem. An index of the most important subjects, though far from complete, is very welcome. Apart from all questions directly connected with the shaman (vocation, choice, initiation, symbolism of the dress and instruments—such as drum, horse-stick etc.—ecstatic journey, ascent to heaven and descent to the underworld, description of the *séance*, etc.), the reader will find numerous other discussions of matters related to the religious background of the shaman's experiences (the numbers 7 and 9, Indo-European and Turkish parallels, importance of bones in the rituals, the horse and the dog, shamans and smiths, the magic fly, the bridge or difficult passage, etc.). Bibliographical references are abundant throughout the book and prove the author's wide reading. For information as well as for a deeper understanding of shamanism this book is indispensable.

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Elements of Social Organization. By Raymond Firth. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. vii, 257 pp. $5.75.

The series of research monographs which Raymond Firth has written on various aspects of "primitive" society have become almost classics in their field. No one has so systematically brought to bear the conceptual apparatus of economics on the data from preliterate societies as Firth did in his *Primitive Polynesian Economy.* No one has given us so complete a picture of the intimate interaction within a primitive family system as Firth did in *We the Tikopia.* His report of the concrete day to day interaction within the religious sphere, *The Work of the Gods in Tikopia,* is a model. It is, then, with considerable interest that one approaches any attempt at synthesis essayed by this renowned scholar. However, one also brings to such a work one's own demands, and it is difficult to separate from those the goals which the author has set for himself.

This book is the written form of the 1947 Josiah Mason Lectures, given at the University of Birmingham in honor of the entrepreneur and philanthropist who founded the Mason Science College in 1880 (which, in turn, became the later foundation for Birmingham University). The lectures were open to all members of the University, and it follows that the subject itself would have to be treated in a broader perspective than the specialist in social anthropology, sociology, or even religion would desire. As a consequence, there are chapters on the meaning of social anthropology, social structure in a small community, social change in peasant communities, as well as chapters on economic organization, primitive art, moral standards and religion. In a book of such wide compass and small physical size, it was possible to do no more than outline some of the major problems, and to offer many fascinating observations drawn from Austrialia, Malaya, Melanesia, Polynesia and Africa. The language is clear and concise, and the discussions deserve a much fuller analysis than can be given here.

Firth presents, in his chapter entitled "Religion in Social Reality," a general synthesis of the sociological theory of religion, as it has gradually been developed by Tylor, Robertson-Smith, Frazer, Durkheim, Marett, Schmidt, Goldenweiser, Radin, Malinowski, and others. He has not attempted to develop a systematic criticism of their failures, but has, rather, concentrated upon a general exposition of the sociological po-

sition. In the main, this position has eschewed any attempt to search for the "ultimate" religious reality, and this has especially been true in more recent theorists, including my own work *(Religion Among the Primitives)*. Rather, the social anthropologist or sociologist wishes to understand how religion "operates." This can be done by systematic observation, by developing specific hypotheses, and by testing them through field studies designed to that end. We know that religion is not simply an intellectual development, but is emotionally powerful, serving as a stimulus to social action in many spheres. Thus, the belief in religion may cause conformity to family tradition, while, in turn, it is in the family that the child acquires attitudes which move him to conform religiously. The religious system demands that goods be produced for religious ends, while, in turn, economic production allows the continuance of the religious system. Firth points out the importance of seeing to what degree religion operates in this world. It is not merely a metaphysical belief about another world. For the primitive, the "other" world is very much here; it is not abstractly separated or dichotomized, as we think of it in our Western tradition.

Firth does fall into the difficulty which sociologists and anthropologists have usually been vexed by—the lack of systematic interview data which will tell us just how the primitive responds emotionally in many religious situations. Lacking these data, we try to fill them in, as Tylor, Frazer, Durkheim, and almost every other theorist has done. We certainly can obtain these data, but we must admit that, for the present, the data do not exist. It is, nevertheless, tempting to develop psychodynamic notions about these emotional processes, as Firth has done. A further gap ought to be seen, the lack of systematic data concerning the points at which there is *mal*-integration between the religious and other spheres, such as the familial, the political, the economic, etc. We are now at a point in our theories of societies where we can use the integration of social structure as a working assumption. It is also clear, on the other hand, that there are many points at which various spheres are in conflict: the political leader may be in conflict with the religious goals, for example, or the religion may demand a great deal of economic waste, etc. These conflicts are not to be taken as deviations from some perfect harmony, but are predictable elements in any social structure. We need to know not only what they are, but how, in spite of the conflict, some of the consequences are avoided or borne.

Firth has written an excellent exposition of some of the main problems in the theory of social organization. We may look forward to his more technical analyses of these same problems when he develops these notions for the specialist.

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Niobe: Neue Studien über antike Religion und Humanität. By KARL KERÉNYI. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1949. 264 pp. Sw. Fr. 19.50.

Pythagoras und Orpheus: Präludien zu einer zukünftigen Geschichte der Orphik und des Pythagoreismus. By KARL KERÉNYI. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1950. 96 pp. Sw. Fr. 8.

This volume by the well-known specialist in ancient mythology and religion consists of ten papers prepared between 1946-1948. Some of them have been delivered before various learned societies; others appeared in *Festschriften* and periodicals. The aim of the book is to offer, so the author tells us, some less known aspects of ancient religion, with emphasis on man and *humanitas* "um welche menschliche Bereicherung (p. 11)." Hence, since the focal point of interest is man in general, it is intended for classicists, archeologists, psychologists, researchers, and laymen. One thing I may be permitted to say at the outset: the learned may be able to follow the involved and rather intricate ways of Kerényi's reasoning; as for the layman, I have my doubts.

The first essay (pp. 13-33) deals with Niobe. She is an "Urfrau," belonging as such "zum griechischen Urmenschen," mother of the human race *(Urmutter),* a divinity who bears, nevertheless, a difficult human lot and is cruelly punished, like Prometheus, because of a human failing. After an unevenly rambling intellectual peregrination, the author arrives at the conclusion that Niobe was a lunar goddess "doch nur . . . Göttin der dunkleren Hälfte oder der dunkleren zwei Drittel [of the moon] (p. 29)." But Niobe had children—who varying in number according to different traditions—had to be fitted in somewhere. Therefore, by a peculiar and not easily followed calculation, Kerényi finally identifies the number of the children with the days of the lunar month. Interesting in this connection is the author's explanation of the mural (discovered at Herculaneum) "The Knucklebone Players." Here Niobe

and Leto (who once were friends) and three other female players appear. The presence of Leto raises the picture into the divine sphere, "oder in jene urzeitliche," when no distance existed between the divine and human. Niobe broke up the game with Leto, and that breakup was her "tragische Verfehlung," and as goddess of the moon, and of the darker fraction of it (what she wanted to secure was the lighter one), she became the bearer of a mother's "Seelenleiden." I have doubts whether this interpretation of Niobe's myth is as "sinvoll" as the author thinks. For conclusive proof more concrete evidence would seem to be required.

The second essay (pp. 34-52), "Bild, Gestalt und Archetypus," introduces Niobe again, but this time with Prometheus. As in the case of Niobe, the author ascribes confidently to Prometheus a "Mondcharacter" (pp. 24, 40); just as Niobe was "Urfrau," so Prometheus is at once "Urmensch," and a representation of the *condition humaine*. The "Urmensch" and "Urfrau" thus become the archetypes of human existence, whose inescapable state of affliction is symbolized by Prometheus and Niobe. We are warned by the author that the term "Urbild," frequently employed in this essay, is not identical in meaning with the term "archetype," employed by C. G. Jung. But the presence of Jungian psychology in this essay and others is rather apparent.

Easier to follow is the third paper, "Urmensch und Mysterium (pp. 53-86)." Here Kerényi analyzes those passages in ancient poetry and philosophy (including the Orphic Hymn to Demeter) which deal with the origin and nature of primitive man. Lucretius, for example, combined in his description of the motherly functions of the earth scientific hypothesis with its mythological background, and so did others. Mankind originated from the earth, the real "Urmutter." But "Urmensch" is not "Mensch"; to become "Mensch" required a second "Formung, Schöpfung oder Geburt." With the Greeks this second birth called for a sanctification through the gifts of Demeter, bread and mysteries, elements on which civilization rests. And it is only through the second phase of his "Erschaffung" that man who originates from the earth becomes a human being (as distinguished from "Urmensch"): "durch eine demetrische und prometheische Vollendung (p. 86)."

The fourth essay, "Die Göttin Natur" (pp. 87-135), is devoted to a long disquisition on the nature, meanings, and various epithets of the Goddess Physis ("Physis" is an "Urwort," a philosophical term, and

the Greek conception of nature is a philosophical conception). To explain all this Kerényi ransacks Greek and Latin literature from Homer to the end of the fourth century A. D. (Claudius Claudianus), Orphic hymns and late magical prayers. The essay concludes with a running commentary on the tenth Orphic Hymn (with a German translation of Christof Tobler), which stresses in particular the epithets by which Physis was invoked.

"Wolf und Ziege am Lupercalienfest" (pp. 136-77) is the subject of the fifth essay. It is well known that the origin of this ceremony was a perplexing problem to the Roman of historical times. On the analogy that *noverca* is derived from *novus* and *lupercus* from *lupus,* Kerényi reasons that there must have existed a wolf-god who required a sacrifice of a wolf (to illustrate this the author mentions that in Argos Apollo received sacrifices of wolves) and that at the Lupercalia of primitive times such a wolf-god received the sacrifice of a wolf. The argument becomes even more involved by his comments on *hircus* (he-goat; *cf.* Ovid, *Fasti* 2.441). According to Kerényi the term originally designated the wolf's peculiarity, namely his shagginess; later, when northern emigrants settled under southern skies, where the goat prevails, *hircus* became a he-goat. The metamorphosis of the wolf into a he-goat is "im Grunde genommen ein Naturphänomen, dessen Schauplatz freilich in der Seele liegt" (p. 147). Credat qui vult![1]

The sixth paper, "Apollon-Epiphanien" (pp. 148-84) is very interesting. Kerényi does not discuss all passages in ancient literature which mention Apollo's epiphany, but he does place, side by side, two epiphanies, one on Delos, the second at Delphi. Hence the twofold division of the paper of which the first part (pp. 151-72) offers a very fine analysis of Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo;* and the second discusses Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 181-182. The paper contains also some revealing observations on Apollo's bow and arrows, snake and snakebites. Especially interesting are his comments on the monuments which point to a connection of the *omphalos* with the snake and to the possibility of a positive relation of Apollo to the snake, an animal in the service of the god.

The seventh essay, "Das Mythologem vom zeitlosen Sein (pp. 185-207), tries to explain the meaning of the Sardinian fable handed down

1. "Lupercus almost certainly means 'averter of wolves,' and a man who ran this holy course was called a Lupercus," is the explanation given by Professor H. J. Rose, *Ancient Roman Religion* (London, 1948), p. 58, with which I agree.

by Aristotle in his *Physics* (4.218 b), where, in his discussion of time, he refers to the men who slept with the heroes in Sardinia, when they awoke. Kerényi maintains that this Sardinian myth is not animistic, and that the ritual of *incubatio* does not help to explain it. A formidable array of topics (ancient sleepers, mythological and calendar numbers, the falling out of time) is brought in here to prove that those who slept with the heroes had fallen out of time and lost entirely their awareness of time —and this is a condition "ohne Zeit." It is, however, the assertion *(Statuierung)* of a state "without passage and without occurrence" that is the meaning of that Sardinian myth (p. 192).

The purpose of the eighth essay, "Die Göttin mit der Schale (pp. 208-30)" is to explain something of the nature of mythology as it existed about the year 150 A. D. The explanation derives from Kerényi's interpretation of a mural of approximately the same date and time Apuleius was composing his *Eros and Psyche*. The female figure holding a vessel Kerényi identifies as Aphrodite, waiting to have it filled by Dionysus. The entire situation, as the author understands it, points to a woman in need of "Erfüllung," nay, "ergänzende Vollendung"—in Greek "Telos" (p. 217). Ariadne, Apuleius' charming tale, a Hindu love story, paintings ancient and modern, sarchophagi—all are brought into the discussion. However, for all its learning and ingenuity, the identification, at least in the reviewer's opinion, rests on a very shaky foundation. What Kerényi fails to prove is whether the painter had this particular myth in mind. "Arbor intrat," the ninth paper (pp. 231-39) and the shortest in the volume, deals with festive events (March 15-28) as recorded in the Roman calendar of Philocalus. The discussion centers mainly around Attis' spring festival.

The last essay is the tenth, "Der Mensch in der griechischen Anschauung" (pp. 240-61). It has much in common with the third essay, for here Kerényi likewise speaks of the "Vollendung" mentioned above. After devoting some space to the contributions of Jäger, Otto, and Wilamowitz to the same subject, he concludes that the Delphic aphorism "know thyself" points to man's position—in the Greek conception—as a concrete element of a world order: "die dem Menschen—griechischer gesprochen: dem Menschengeschlecht—nicht etwa nur in sich schliesst . . . sondern auch faktisch als ihre eigene Grudlage enthält" (p. 247). The essay closes with remarks on Roman *humanitas*.

The second book, *Pythagoras und Orpheus* bears the imprint of *Albae Vigiliae,* a series devoted to furthering contributions in the field of the history of religions, antiquity, and cultural history. Since this pamphlet appears now in the third and enlarged edition (the first appeared I think in 1938), it will suffice to give its salient points only.

The pamphlet consists of three papers all of which stress the early cultural interrelationships among the peoples of the Mediterranean world. The purpose of the first essay "Pythagoreische und orphische Seele" (pp. 11-45) is to explain the real relationship between Pythagoras and Orpheus through a study of teachings and myths concerning the soul. The sum total of Kerényi's speculation is the conclusion that there is very considerable difference between the Pythagorean and Orphic soul: the Pythagorean was essentially aristocratic, while the Orphic was unaristocratic and dangerous to any real aristocracy. The Orphic soul failed to create for itself a co-operative body which could rightly be considered a counterpart to the Pythagorean communities. Consequently the Orphic conception contributed to the victory of the principle of the equality of all souls.

The second paper, "Die orpische Kosmogonie und der Ursprung der Orphik" (pp. 49-65) Kerényi calls an attempt at reconstruction. It is a fact that what we know of Orphism is based on later sources, the earlier ones being lost. Kerényi therefore begins by stressing the transformation of Greek culture from the seventh to the sixth centuries which produced new intellectual phenomena, like philosophy, new religious claims and, above all, the introductions of a religious "Schriftstellerei." All this is important for Orphic cosmogony and anthropology. The question of what Orpheus embodies as a "Gestalt" Kerényi answers in some detail. He considers it an initiation which changes wild creatures and primitive men of the woods, not so much through food and mysteries or fire and handicraft, as through something which young men (hunters), excluding women, experienced singing and playing while camping in the wilderness. That experience was something "Geistiges," a "Mythologem das den Zeremonien des Übergangs aus dem unreifen Alter in das reife einen tieferen Sinn gab" (p. 56). The prophet of this "Mythologem" played the lyre, but he was more than an ordinary player; he was the initiator—and this is the content of the "Gestalt" and name of Orpheus. Generally speaking Kerényi traces the origins of Orphism to an association or company of hunters. The paper closes with a discussion of Or-

phic cosmogony, Eros, and a laying down of the Orphic doctrines in texts, a step necessary to the establishment of the corpus of Orphic literature.

The third essay, "Die Pythagoreische Seelenwanderung in II Jahrhundert vor Christus" (pp. 69-88), will be welcomed by students of Latin literature. Here Kerényi points out the degree to which the Pythagorean doctrine of metempsychosis influenced the *Epicharmus* and *Annales* of the Roman poet Ennius. In Ennius, however, this doctrine is not as aristocratic, but it is, nevertheless, of the same type.

One leaves these two publications with mixed feelings. No one will deny Kerényi's vast knowledge of original source materials and his familiarity with modern literature on the subject.[2] The crux of the situation is the highly speculative and intuitive way in which he interprets his materials. His boldness of exposition more often disregards than disproves accepted views. His *oculi mentis*, if I may use the expression, seem to wear glasses tinted with Jungian psychology. His style, highly metaphysical and vague, often obscures the very problem he purports to elucidate. There is present a strong tendency to seek out esoteric explanations for problems more acceptably explained in relatively simple terms. Nevertheless, the present reviewer considers that both publications merit careful reading, if only for the basic reason that they present to the scholar a whole new range of interpretations and problems.

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Les religions chinoises. By Henri Maspero. Paris: Civilisations du Sud, 1950. 255 pp. 465 fr.

Le Taoïsme. By Henri Maspero. Paris Civilisations du Sud, 1950. 268 pp. 465 fr.

Études historiques sur la Chine. By Henri Maspero. Paris: Civilisations du Sud, 1950. 270 pp. 465 fr.

On the 28th of July, 1944, Henri Maspero was arrested in Paris by the German police as a reprisal for the resistance activity of his son.

2. However, in the notes I find no reference to the work of Kurt von Fritz, *Pythagorean Politics in Southern Italy. An Analysis of the Sources* (New York, 1940).

He was deported to the death camp of Buchenwald, where he died after seven months of misery and torture. So was brutally interrupted by an untimely death the constant toil of a great scholar, whose life had been one of sheer devotion to scientific duty. An enormous mass of notes and research material was found in Henri Maspero's study. Some documents being in shape for publishing, Professor Demiéville, with the consent and help of Mme. Maspero, herself one of the rare survivors of the German Ravensbruck camp for women, undertook the publication.

In this part of Maspero's scientific legacy which could be transmitted to scholars, two kinds of works were sorted and classified. Some are of a technical character and will be published later in highly specialized magazines. Others have a wider interest and pertain to the religions and history of China. These essays published by the Musée Guimet belong to the latter category and have been grouped in three volumes: I. *Les religions Chinoises;* II. *Le Taoïsme;* III. *Études historiques.*

As space is short we shall give here only a brief review of the two first volumes devoted to religious problems. In the first volume we shall stress the importance of the main essay, "La religion chinoise dans son développement historique."

Taking as a starting point the religion of the ancient Chinese, Maspero gives a concise and enlightening outline of the religious evolution of China down to the popular religion of modern times. Historian and linguist as well, he points to the influences of political and social changes on the development of religious ideas. New ideas creep in without any rash breaking of the tradition, and such a slow process brings in the illusory feeling that past beliefs are still alive. Whereas in truth the modern religion is an original product. Religious experience is one, so that to speak of China's three religions is to violate the unity of life. It would be just as vain, writes Maspero, to dissociate in the actual Christian faith those elements which are Jewish, Oriental, or Greek. All the same, textual study of the religious literature will explain many facts and allow us to be in sympathy with the religious psychology of China.

To understand China's religious phenomenon a knowledge of Taoism as a religious way of life is essential. Ancient Taoism, in its mystic value, has inspired many serious and even outstanding studies, but of the history of Taoism during the first centuries of the Christian

era only vague notions were to be gathered here and there. All the worse for us, since it was during those few centuries that the basic ideas of Chinese medieval and modern thought have been formed. It is one of Maspero's most striking merits to have started in a masterful way on this abstruse field of work.

Because of its technical character, the Taoist Scripture is a section in the literature of China, which none but a master in sinology could venture to explore. That is why the second volume of Guimet's publication is of such vital interest. Three unpublished essays have been collected in this little book. In the main one, entitled "Essai sur le Taoïsme aux premiers siècles de l'Ere Chrétienne," all the major aspects of Taoism are presented: I. Individual religious life and the search for immortality; II. Taoist Communities and Public Cult; III. Taoism and the beginnings of Buddhism in China.

Critical discussion of any special part of the work being beyond the scope of such a short review, we can only stress that this part of Maspero's research here disclosed could serve as a leading line to most important studies. On careful reading, it appears that the knowledge here brought to light has weighty consequences in many ways. Not a fact is advanced, not an idea is put forward without the writer referring to the original texts, and this brings with it minute technical secrets and recipes which we feel to be of wide meaning.

Further and careful studies might well prove that Taoist technics should serve as a keyhole to a true understanding of the Chinese poetic and artistic mind, as well as to China's approach to certain scientific problems in biology, physics, and medicine.

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Confucius and Christ. By L. Sherley-Price. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. 248 pp. $4.75.

Religion in Chinese Garment. By Karl Ludwig Reichelt. Translated by Joseph Tetlie. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. v, 180 pp. $4.50.

Now that China is coming more and more under Communist domination and the Bamboo Curtain conceals what is going on behind it, any

recent book about China will naturally be read. The reader will want to know just what is going on in the minds of the Chinese people, and those specially interested in religion are wondering how a people which has for centuries been under the influence of certain great religious values and ideals is reacting towards this avowedly anti-religious new "religion." There can be no doubt as to the impact which the Kremlin has made or as to the loyalty of the Chinese Communist leaders to the Communist program, but it is difficult to believe that China's great cultural and spiritual heritage will not make itself felt sooner or later so that Chinese Communism will gradually evolve into something that is a little more humane than the Russian type and more in line with the age-old Chinese way of life. It is, perhaps, too early to know just what the outcome will actually be, but one can at least make a survey of China's spiritual assets which are relevant to the present situation.

Now the two volumes under review concern themselves definitely with the nature of China's spiritual heritage. They make no attempt to relate this definitely to the situation produced by Communism, but each of them, in varying ways, does present a good deal of material quite relevant for an answer to the question as to what can reasonably be expected as the final outcome.

The author of *Confucius and Christ* states that he had a twofold purpose in view. The first was "to present Confucius to the reader in such a way that he can make a fair estimate of the value and relevance of his teachings." He thus introduces Confucius the man, and, in chapter after chapter, presents his chief teachings. He purposely confines himself largely to Confucius' own views rather than how his views were interpreted down through the centuries or what Confucianism means in the life of the present generation of Chinese. This, of course, leaves unanswered some of the questions that are most pertinent to the present day situation. The author does, however, give the reader what is on the whole a fair and comprehensive understanding of what Confucius had to say on matters which are relevant in solving life's problems under any circumstances and, therefore, could be quite relevant in meeting the situation created by Russian Communism.

The second purpose which the author has in view is "to show that natural philosophy has a vital and important part to play in every day life, but that all our aspirations towards truth and virtue are largely impotent and frustrated unless they are supported by a sound metaphys-

ical foundation." His approach is thus definitely that of any avowed religious believer and, more specifically, a Christian. This is indicated in the subtitle of the volume, "A Christian Estimate of Confucius" and made quite explicit in the way he presents the subject matter of almost every chapter. Thus he usually gives Confucius' views on a given subject and then follows it up with the Christian view, pointing out what he regards as shortcomings in the former and how the latter gives the more adequate answer to life's hard questions. He concludes that Confucius' "teachings can to a large extent be regarded as a *praeparatio evangelii,*" but he feels that Confucius had all too little to say on what is so central in religion, namely, about God and man's relationship to God. He would not agree with those who regard Confucius as an agnostic or sceptic, for "his conduct and his sayings about 'Heaven' would hardly justify this" estimate, but he does insist that "his religious knowledge was little in advance of his neighbors." Confucius was, after all, only a "moral, political and social reformer" but lacked much in the way of giving his reforms a "sound metaphysical foundation"; and it is this latter which "in the Christian view, has been provided for us by Jesus Christ in His revelation of 'the inexhaustible mystery of the Being of God.' "

This volume will undoubtedly be welcomed by Christian workers dealing with Confucianists. Probably the average student of non-Christian religions will feel that, however accurate the author's statements are as to what is lacking in Confucius' teachings regarding the Divine and the inadequacies in other respect that stem from this, it would have been more convincing if this had been stated in a concluding chapter rather than in the Foreword.

Religion in Chinese Garment, by Dr. Reichelt, is much more comprehensive in its scope, since it covers the whole range of China's traditional religions. Beginning with "Animism and its Philosophic Background," the author proceeds with a survey of Confucianism, the Cult of Ancestors, Taoism, Chinese Buddhism, Chinese Mohammedanism, and ending with an account of various sects stemming in one way or another from Buddhism and Taoism and other influences. While the author has something to say in these successive chapters about the founders of religions in China, the classical expression of their teachings as transmitted in the sacred literature, and the various schools of philosophies that were developed down through the centuries, he is more concerned

with portraying what religion has actually been and more or less continues to be in the life of the average Chinese believer. The title, "Religion in Chinese Garment" is most apt. However great the differences have been between the classical expressions of Confucianism, Taoism, and Chinese Buddhism, religion in the life of the Chinese masses is really more or less *one* garment woven with threads taken in varying proportions from all three major religions, and with a good many also from primitive animism. That is what makes Dr. Reichelt's contribution to an understanding of Chinese religion so valuable and unique. One may find more adequate treatments of Confucian philosophy, Classical Taoism, and Chinese Buddhist schools of though in works by other Western scholars, but no one is quite the equal of Dr. Reichelt in giving one a real understanding of what religion has meant or continues to mean to the Chinese people. In an earlier volume, *Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism,* the author had given us that sort of insight into the life of Chinese Buddhists. In this volume he is equally successful in enabling the reader to see Chinese religion "from within," even though he is always duly critical in his appraisal. What was said of that earlier volume might well be said of this one, namely, that in it we have "the work of neither the partisan adversary, nor the partisan advocate, nor yet of a cold and scholarly but personally indifferent (and quite objective) student of the history of religions," but rather "an illuminating appreciation of what is best and even of much which at first sight seems hopelessly superstitious in this ancient and prolific faith."

Unfortunately for China there is too much in the religion of the masses which not only "seems" hopelessly superstitious but is all too much of that character and thus more or less justifies the Communist charge that religion in its very nature is little more than a web of superstition with its face turned towards the past, or that it seeks to answer man's dissatisfaction with his present lot by issuing a bogus check to be cashed in the world beyond. And what is even more ominous in the present situation is that too many of China's intellectuals seem rather indifferent to, if not actually scornful of, the best in their own spiritual heritage which is of permanent value and could meet man's deeper needs which Communism ignores. One could, therefore, wish that Dr. Reichelt had given us a little more information on what some of the more intelligent religious leaders in China—both non-Christians and

Christians—think about the Communist challenge and how they, as men of religion, propose to meet it.

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The Jews: Their History, Culture, and Religion. Edited by LOUIS FINKELSTEIN. 2 vols. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1950. xxxiii, 1431 pp. $12.00.

These two volumes are the fruit of a most ambitious enterprise. For perhaps four millennia the Jews have managed to preserve the inner core of their religion, despite occasional degeneration within, despite almost constant attack from without. As the environment within which Jewish culture existed and maintained itself varied, adjustments and alterations have been made in the religious fabric of Judaism. The changes that proved viable, over the long run, have been those that affected the peripheral areas of cult, leaving the central core intact. *The Jews* is the record of an attempt by a group of outstanding scholars, under the leadership of President Finkelstein, of the Jewish Theological Seminary, (a) to tell the millennial story of the interrelations of Jewish life and Jewish religion, (b) to trace topically the part Judaism has played in the making of world civilization, (c) to present a sociological and demographic analysis of the Jew in the world of today; and (d) to describe the beliefs and practices of Judaism. Even to list these four major phases of presentation in *The Jews* is equivalent to suggesting that only a multi-volume encyclopedia could accomplish what the editors and contributors to this work set out to do.

This reservation granted, the overall result in *The Jews* reaches an unusually high level. Without being able to communicate enough detail, yet many of the contributors succeed in communicating the excitement of Jewish studies, and in painting in their various styles particular sections of the panorama intended by the planning group. Indeed, it cannot be laid at the door of the authors that the attempt to compress a library into fewer than fifteen hundred pages converts the panorama into a kaleidoscopic succession of views. In retrospect, however, it is truly amazing how many questions are at least partially answered by the scholars who made this book. Among these questions are some of those

most frequently asked by both Jews and their non-Jewish neighbors. An appendix designed to serve as a guide to the seeker of these answers lists 29 "questions raised most frequently in 209 replies to a questionnaire sent scholars and educators throughout the United States in 1946-1947." What is a Jew? What is the Jewish creed? What was the origin of the synagogue and its development? Does Judaism seek or accept converts? What is the attitude of Judaism to Jesus? and so on. To most of these questions only a fragmentary suggestion of an answer is given by any one contributor; frequently, however, many articles discuss each question briefly, and the fragments begin to form a mosaic—and not infrequently a Mosaic—answer.

The first division of the book contains articles surveying the history of Judaism and the Jews. William F. Albright surveys the biblical period with his usual grace and competence; the materials of this section have been so thoroughly reworked in the light of recent archeological "finds" that each new survey reads like a new history. It may be this reviewer's amateur interest in Near Eastern archeology that leads him to feel that Albright's essay is the most successful of these historical pieces. At the same time, it should be said that assertions of biblical accuracy based upon the correspondence of certain details with evidence unearthed by archeologists can be—perhaps has been—carried too far. Writers of historical fiction are well aware of the advantage of building one's fantasy around a solid structure of fact, in order (in the phrase of W. S. Gilbert) "to lend verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative." There has been far too hasty and uncritical a reaction to the uncritical biblical criticisms of a half-century ago. Elias J. Bickerman continues his interesting reconstruction of the post-biblical period in the second article. Judah Goldin contributes a survey of nearly 1200 years of "the period of the Talmud" in the third essay, and Cecil Roth treats European Jewish history to 1648 and the history of the Jew in western Europe since 1648 in two over-condensed chapters. The treatments of the Jew and Jewish life in America by Anita L. Lebeson and by Moshe Davis were for this reader the least satisfactory parts of the section.

In the second section, on "the role of Judaism in civilization," scholarship is found more often in combination with eulogy than with critical evaluation. The twenty-one articles in this section make up far too large a unit for detailed comment here. The reviewer found most rewarding

Israel S. Chipkin's study of "Judaism and Social Welfare"; Eric Warner, on "The Jewish Contribution to Music"; Rachel Wischnitzer, on "Judaism and Art"; and Charles Singer, on "Science and Judaism." There is a great deal of interesting information in Arturo Castiglioni, "The Contribution of the Jews to Medicine"; Walter J. Fischel, "Israel in Iran (A Survey of Judeo-Persian Literature)"; Ralph Marcus, "Hellenistic Jewish Literature"; and Abraham S. Halkin, "Judeo-Arabic Literature."

The modern tendency of scholars to seek the origin of democratic ideals in the various religious traditions (replacing an older, and probably more accurate, tendency to see religion and democratic ideals in opposition) is exemplified by Milton R. Konvitz, "Judaism and the Democratic Ideal." Such studies seem to this reader always as somewhat forced attempts to read back into earlier documents ideals their authors never intended and implications that might have horrified those authors; the purpose of such a retrospective sanctioning of democratic ideals has never become clear. If the religious tradition considers itself superior to democracy, it can well afford not to bother with attempts to annex democratic ideals; this the record of the Roman Catholic Church blazons forth to the world. It is only if the religious tradition recognizes the superiority of democracy, admits its own inferiority, and acknowledges its need to derive strength from the lusty humanism of democracy that apologetics need take this form. When will the day come in which a religious leader will have the courage and the honesty to say, "My religion did not invent democratic ideals; in fact, any reliable historical study will show that members of my religious denomination fought against the development of democratic ideals and practices. But we were wrong and we now recognize that we were wrong in our opposition. We now, therefore, have adapted our views to democratic thinking, and are introducing a democratic article into our creed"?

The third section, on the sociology and demography of the Jews includes contributions by Melville J. Herskovits, Uriah Zevi Engelman, Jacob Lestschinsky, Nathan Reich, and Samuel C. Kohs. These authors would undoubtedly agree that, over and above the merit of their individual contributions, the greatest importance of what they have done is to indicate the value of applying the techniques of recent social science to the study of Jewish life. Not nearly enough has been done of this type of work. It is here, rather than in apologetics, that a new dimension can be added to the study of religion.

In the final section of the book, Dr. Finkelstein has reprinted a revised version of his earlier paper on "The Jewish Religion: Its Beliefs and Practices." There is no better brief statement; Finkelstein has been notably fair to the Orthodox and Reform positions in this statement, though his Conservative orientation is clear throughout.

There are useful bibliographies appended to each article. Notes consist largely of cross-references to other articles in the volume. The index is certainly not adequate for a work of this magnitude. In general, editorial style and transliteration are as consistent as one can expect. We have good reason to be deeply grateful to Dr. Finkelstein and his colleagues for their long labor to make this work sound and useful. The work itself is a lasting monument in their honor.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

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Saint Augustine and the Donatist Controversy. By GEOFFREY GRIMSHAW WILLIS. London: S.P.C.K., 1950, xv, 199 pp. 15*s*.

Not a little neglect, ill-will, and censure have come to St. Augustine from writers of the English-speaking world. It is reassuring to read a work in which glowing tributes are paid to him: he is lauded as "a great doctor," and his works as "a perennial fount of Christian wisdom."

Three historical backgrounds gave shape and expression to the contents of the writings of St. Augustine. Against the Manichees, he formed his doctrines on God, against the Donatists his doctrine on the Church, and against the Pelagians his doctrine on the supernatural order. The work under review deals with the Donatist controversy and the doctrines involved; viz., the nature of the Church, the Sacraments, the relation of Church and State. On the whole, the book offers the best presentation in the English language of this phase of Augustine's life and writings. The historical account of the Donatist schism, its backgrounds, development, is well done and throws much light on the Africa of St. Augustine and the doctrines at issue. The author is less effective in forming a synthesis of the Church. A reconstruction of it must be made along these lines.

The Church of St. Augustine—the *Catholica*, the *Ecclesia*, or the *Ecclesia Catholica*—is a definite and specific institution with four char-

acteristic notes: oneness, catholicity, apostolicity, and holiness. He invisages this Church under a twofold aspect—the one external or visible, the other internal or invisible.

Viewed from its external aspect, the Church is a juridical, social, sacramental and hierarchic organization. In his writings against the Donatists (not to mention passages written against others), Augustine argues for the unity and genuineness of the Church of Christ by appealing to the Roman See: "Number the Bishops even from the very seat of St. Peter, and see every succession in that line of Fathers: that seat is the rock against which the proud gates of hell shall not prevail" *(Psalmus contra partem Donati,* PL 43, 30). In a letter written by St. Augustine to Gloriosus and his colleagues, the Roman Church is said to be one "in which the primacy of the apostolic chair always flourished" *(Ep.* 4, 3, 7; PL 33, 163; CSEL 34, II, 90). The term "primacy" *(principatus)* employed here is also used to denote St. Peter's primacy among the apostles—*apostolatus principatum (Sermo* 76, 3; PL 38, 480).

In a work, written some years later with great probability by St. Prosper, a friend of St. Augustine, we read: ". . . which (Rome) was made greater through the primacy of the apostolic priesthood by its stronghold of religion rather than by its seat of power" *(De voc. om. gent.,* II, 16; PL 51, 905). Again from another Anti-Donatist work of St. Augustine, we read: "For if the order of bishops succeeding each other must be considered, how much more certainly and salutarily do we count from Peter himself, to whom as bearing the figure of the whole Church the Lord said: 'Upon this rock . . .' Linus succeeded Peter, . . ." then follows the succession of Roman Bishops *(Ep.* 53, 2; PL 33, 196; CSEL 34, II, 153). These words of St. Augustine are reminiscent of his elder colleague Optatus of Mileve writing against the same schism: "You cannot deny that you know that the episcopal *cathedra* was given first to Peter in the city of Rome, in which *(cathedra)* Peter the head of all the Apostles sat, whence he was called Cephas, in which one *cathedra* unity was preserved by all" *(De schis. Donat.,* II, 2; PL 2, 947).

Viewed from its invisible aspect the Church is a spiritual organism of members united by faith, hope, and charity. It constitutes the Mystical Body of Christ of which the Holy Ghost is the soul. The Church is an institution for salvation: the Body of Christ is continually being formed here on earth that it may remain the Body of Christ in heaven for ever. Heretics infringe on the oneness of faith, and schismatics

breach the bond of charity. Both are outside the Church, the Mystical Body of Christ.

The visible Church is neither in whole or in part a different entity than the *corpus Christi*. Being one and the same Church, viewed from different aspects, they are coextensive. What about sinners in the Church? They are certainly members of the juridical Church in accordance with the many passages of Sacred Writ. But they are also, in their own way, a part of the Mystical Body of Christ. In kind or quality they differ: the true member of the Mystical Body possesses the life of grace in his soul, whereas the sinner is devoid of it. The just one is a living member of Christ, the sinner is a dead member. The contours of two ethical (and to a certain extent disparate) structures are discernible within the Church, city, house, and temple of God. The sinners by their lives and internal condition constitute, as it were, a society of their own; the just by their deeds and internal status form, as it were, a body within a body.

Besides, Augustine views the Church from the standpoint of God's prescience. At times he sees those already as members of it who are still outside but whose future conversion is foreknown to God. At times he narrows the extension of the Church's membership to the predestined. God now foresees those who will persevere and attain their salvation. These are said truly to form the Body of Christ here upon earth. Predestination does not dispense with the Church; it presupposes and necessitates it as a means to salvation.

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Seven More Poems. By Nicholas Bozon. Edited and translated by Sister M. Amelia (Klenke), O.P. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1951. ix, 162 pp. $2.00.

The present volume is a sequel to *Three Saints' Lives,* by Nicholas Bozon, edited and translated by Sister M. Amelia (Klenke), which was reviewed in the *Review of Religion,* XIV (1949), 59-64. In the present volume the editor has undertaken to publish or republish the remaining six saints' lives in MS Cotton Domitian XI, as well as a "Gospel Poem" from the same MS, a reproduction of which was sent to her by error. In point of fact, this latter work is of much greater interest than the saints' lives

which, like those previously published, are in the main mere adaptations of those of the *Golden Legend*. It is not entirely clear why the poem is called the "Gospel Poem," or rather, as it is in the MS: *"Le Evangel translaté de latin en frranceys,"* for it is not at all a translation of any Gospel, but rather a well conceived and quite vigorous doctrinal and hortatory treatment of divine and human love, with greater dependence on the epistles of Saint Paul and Ecclesiasticus than on the Gospels themselves. Another recension of this text had previously been published by Paul Meyer in *Romania* XXIX, 5 et ss.

Although Sister Amelia recognizes that this text is "on a higher literary plane than Bozon's Saints' *Lives*" (p. 3), she has nonetheless persuaded herself that it also is from his pen. She develops her arguments at some length, but none of them seems at all convincing to this reviewer, and some of them are completely unfounded conjectures. Because one recension of the text addresses itself twice near the end of the poem to a *"bele soere,"* and because one MS of the other recension of the text is bound together with "documents of different kinds pertaining to the Benedictine Monastery at Bec" (p. 3), and because Sister Amelia believes that Nicholas (Sister uses the name *Nicholas* throughout, although *Nicole* seems to be the better authenticated form) Bozon is the author of the text, she is led to imagine that he may have had a sister, who may have been a religious—"conceivably a Benedictine—and for whom he may have composed this Gospel Poem" (p. 3). So compounded a conjecture can surely bear no weight at all. The resemblances between this work and those of Nicole Bozon are not distinctive enough to give even slight support to its attribution to him, whereas the differences in style and thought are considerable enough to make one demand cogent proof before accepting such an attribution. Nowhere in Friar Nicole's works does he organize his material so well and present it with such strength and conviction. His writings, on the whole, are much more pedestrian and jejune in style. The saints' lives in this volume are, with the exception of that of Saint Elizabeth, merely watered down adaptations of those in the *Golden Legend,* with even more *naïveté* and violence, and occasionally a ferocity which springs from a mind quite different from that of the anonymous author of the poem on divine love. At the end of the life of Saint Juliana, for example, Bozon tells us that her persecutor, *Elege* (Eulogius) was "drowned shamefully" *(cheytivement,* Bozon's word, would perhaps be better translated as "miserably"), and then he

adds quite gratuitously that "I shall never say for the soul of that man / Either Pater Noster or Ave Maria." The author of the Gospel Poem on the other hand, reminds us in a more truly Christian manner, that "Jesus loved His enemies / And He commanded us to do this. / Says He: 'Love your enemies; / Do good to those who hate you' " (lines 79-82), and Himself teaches that "no one can love aright / If he does not hold dear his enemy; / And he alone, then, loves aright / Who loves the one who hates him" (lines 65-68).

More serious than this doubtful conjecture as to the authorship of the "Gospel Poem," is the evidence of a lack of sufficient technical competence to edit and translate an Old French poem at all. The editor's knowledge of the language, of palaeography, and of philological method is quite inadequate to the task she undertook. While there were some errors in the previous volume, there are very many more in the present one, due no doubt to the fact that, unlike the first one, it is not a doctoral dissertation, and so did not profit by expert supervision. Lines 15-16 of the life of St. Elizabeth, among many others, are misunderstood, and so mispunctuated and mistranslated. The editor writes:

> Tut fut ele mult honuree;
> Le honour del mound ad poy amee.

and translates: "As a little girl she was exceedingly honored; / She little cared for worldly honor." A note at the bottom of the page tells us that "TUT, f., (little girl) is a non-Godefroi (sic) word. However Godefroi does list TOZ (little boy)." Sister Amelia evidently doesn't know that the feminine of *toz* (< *tonsu*) is *tose,* or probably in the Anglo-Norman dialect of these texts, *tuse,* and that it could not possibly be *tut.* If she had consulted her Godefroy more carefully, she would have found that *tot* (represented by *tut* in these texts, as the glossary shows) can be a conjunction meaning *although,* and that that is certainly its meaning in this passage.

Similarly the word *utim (Agnes,* 226, 245) was not recognized as meaning *eighth,* and so its meaning is given in the glossary as *next,* although line 226, *Le utim jour aprés suant,* is translated as "Two days later." Any good manual (such as Mildred K. Pope, *From Latin to Modern French,* pp. 444-45) would have pointed out that in Anglo-Norman the diphthong *ui* is frequently reduced to *u; indeed,* in just one of the very texts here edited we have *su* (= *sui, Agatha* 54, 107), *suy* rhyming with

Jhesu (Agatha 51-52), *nute* (= *nuit)* rhyming with *apparut (Agatha* 103-104) and *nut* (= *nuit)* rhyming with *fut (Agatha* 121-122). If Sister had consulted the large Godefroy dictionary instead of the small one, she would have found s.v. *utime* a cross-reference to *oitisme* and the proper meaning. Or she might have been put on the right track if she had consulted the source of the life of St. Agnes in the *Golden Legend,* where it is made clear that the second celebration is on the *octave* of the feast of the saint.

Similar instances of insufficient linguistic preparation are far too numerous to mention here, as are those of insufficient palaeographical experience and judgment. Sister is evidently unaware that one cannot take too seriously the apparent joinings of the short vertical strokes used by medieval scribes to form the letters *i, j, u, v, n,* and *m.* Accordingly she reads *nus* for *mis (Gospel* 121), *mise* for *juise (Gospel* 391), *oures* (hours) for *ovres* (works ,*Gospel* 687), *lana* for *lava (Elizabeth* 95), and *enconutra* for *encountra (Elizabeth* 331), thereby usually offering a text with no acceptable meaning, although, in most of these cases, her variants recorded from the readings of other editors should have shown her the correct forms. Similarly the editor does not appear to know that *c* and *t,* being formed almost identically, are frequently confused by the scribes, and accordingly she prints *blanche toneyle* (white tunnel, *Gospel* 38), which makes no sense at all, and then adds "[i.e., the white blackbird]," with a note at the foot of the page to the effect that *toneyle* is "evidently a scribal error," and that two other MSS have the correct reading *cornaille, corneille.* The same confusion is probably the source of the form which Sister prints as *gace (Elizabeth* 52, 56) and translates as "basket (?)." Godefroy, as she states, does not list the work *gace* which is attested nowhere; but here again, if she had consulted the large edition, she would have found *gate* listed as a variant spelling (and the proper Anglo-Norman one) of *jatte* (= bowl).

Lack of experience, likewise, is probably to blame for such forms as *Catana* (passim) for *Catania,* for a reference to the German Caesarius of Heisterbach as "Césaire de Heisterbach" (p. 60), for the apparent impression that the *Acta Sanctorum* were written by Bollandus (p. 104), and that there is a medieval writer called Augustodun whose work is "discussed" by Migne in *Pat. Lat.,* CLXXII, col. 1037 (p. 49). The writer in question is, of course, Honorius Augustodunensis, and the error stems from the heading at the top of the page, "HONORII AUGUSTODUN.

OPP. PARS III. LITURGICA." A glance at the title-page would have furnished the correct form of the name.

Although some of the many other errors in the book may be due to lapses on the part of the printer, there are still a great number that must be laid at the editor's door. She quotes, for example, from the "blurb" (sic) of Anna Seesholtz' book on St. Elizabeth to the effect that the "immediate outward influences on her life" were St. Francis of Assisi, Emperor Frederick II, and Pope Pius IX" (p. 59)! It makes little difference whether the *Pius* is attributable to the "blurb" or to the editor of the present volume; an attentive reading would have corrected it to Gregory IX. Since this is far from an isolated slip, we can only conclude that the book suffers from extreme carelessness as well as from a lack of technical competence and sound philological method, and, inasmuch as it offers no historical, literary, or religious study of the texts themselves, the volume is little more than an unsatisfactory performance of a philological task.

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The Psychology of Love according to St. Bonaventure. By ROBERT P. PRENTICE, O.F.M. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1951. xiv, 136 pp. $2.00.

This work, in the modest words of its author, constitutes a "reconstruction" of St. Bonaventure's infrequent, sketchy, widely scattered texts, or rather chance remarks on human, that is, natural love—"that love which man can exercise independently of his elevation to a supernatural state" (p. vii). Dr. Prentice's work is remarkable first of all, therefore, because of his having gathered such fragmentary material into a clearly organized theory of love, thus doing for St. Bonaventure and for theology what the Franciscan theologian did not do himself.

Dr. Prentice's work, and apparently also that of the Seraphic Doctor, is primarily a quasi-phenomenological analysis of the nature of love in its divers forms, and only secondarily a theory of value. Dr. Prentice discerns similarities between St. Bonaventure's method and that of Max Scheler and even Jaspers, but the author is wary of the fact that such comparisons have a way of leading to overstatements and took care to avoid them.

In contrast to Scheler's thesis, St. Bonaventure favored a nearly monistic (because moderately-realist) conception of love, considering the term "love" applicable to the entire range of affections commonly referred to by that term: from love for food to love for God. The thesis is monistic within the framework of Dr. Prentice's study as confined to the "psychology" of love, thus leaving untouched the issue concerning a final duality of human and divine love. Noteworthy in St. Bonaventure's theory is that human love in its most perfect form is mutual, including sexual love. It is thought of as a valid and effective form of a love which is virtually indistinguishable in quality from the mystic love for God, since both are characterized as an ecstatic union in which each lover "rests in the other as in his own end."

Contrary to expectations, the metaphysical foundation of his psychology of love is predominantly Aristotelian. Only the mystical motif stems from the Neoplatonic-Dionysic (but not Augustinian) tradition, transmitted to him through his Franciscan predecessors as well as St. Bernard, St. Anselm, and Hugh of St. Victor.

He defines love variously as "the motive power of the will." Just as the intellect needs a certain natural light if it is to judge accurately in moral matters, so the will needs a certain natural warmth inducing it to an ordinate and right love . . . love being that by which the will takes possession of beatitude" (p. 23). Love is "an affection which is elicited by the will through the immediate agency of the concupiscible (acquisitive) appetite" (p. 30). Love is any sort of union of the will with any sort of object and, therefore, St. Bonaventure does not exclude affective union from love; love is a particular form of affection. However, pleasure does not enter the essential concept of love (p. 52). The essence of love is union in which the lover is transformed into the beloved, similar to St. Thomas' conception of the union of knowing and being. The latter, however, is a purely cognitional union which does not transform the knower. It only makes him "conform" to the thing known. A holy man, for example, may know baseness, but this does not make him base. The union of love is a truly self-transforming love in which the lover is transformed into the likeness of the beloved although not into the beloved himself. He will be like him in action, for his actions will be of such a kind that they will be in accord with the nature of the beloved.

Though within the limits of human love, love is interpreted monisti-

cally, distinctions concerning the value of the various phenomena of love are maintained. The object must not be loved as much as, or more than God. An object must not be loved more than it ought to be loved, or should not be loved if it ought not to be loved at all. The criteria here are the worthiness of the object. A distinction is further maintained between egocentric and alterocentric love, in which respect the criterion is the attitude or motive of the lover. Egocentric love is concerned with the delectable and the useful; alterocentric love refers to the *bonum honestum,* the intrinsic, or "ultimate" person, and is elicited by the worth or "dignity" of that person who, therefore, is loved "for his own sake." Since egocentric love prevents union and alterocentric love makes union possible, and since it is in union that the self finds its own beatitude, alterocentric love is superior since here the self, though losing itself, finds itself ultimately "in the other as in his own end" (p. 113).

The spiritual relevance of individual love is admitted; for, in St. Bonaventure's own words, "Love is like a fire, the more it is scattered and divided, the more it is diminished, but the more it is brought together the more it is increased" (pp. 59 f.). Intensity, concentration of love, has something to do with its perfection by virtue of its undividedness.

In Dr. Prentice's appraisal, St. Bonaventure's consummate view is noteworthy, despite the limited extent of its originality. Among its more original details the author names his understanding of the primary concept of love and of the non-cognitional knowledge derived from selfless love. Dr. Prentice further recommends the sobriety and balance—instead of lyricism—which characterizes St. Bonaventure's writings on the subject of love.

To this reviewer, St. Bonaventure's views are significant as representing a relatively early trend toward an emancipation from the Augustinian tradition with its sceptical appraisal of the religious validity of human love. It also raises the question, however, as to whether such liberation can be successful within the metaphysical framework of Aristotelian and medieval psychology, or the mystical criterion of ecstatic transformation culminating in the thesis that "human love is of the *delectio exemplata*—human love, the image of the divine" (p. 134).

HERTA PAULY

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Mennonite Piety through the Centuries: Its Genuis and its Literature. By Robert Friedmann. Goshen, Indiana: The Mennonite Historical Society, 1949. xvi, 287 pp. $3.50.

This signal contribution to Anabaptist spiritual history and historiography is actually two books in one. Study I, an examination of Anabaptism and Pietism, was originally written in German and grew out of European researches quite apart from Mennonite contacts. Study II, with its beginnings in America at a much later date, is basically oriented in that Mennonite life with which both studies have such a close historical and contemporary association. The author himself perceives the underlying unity of the two parts only upon the conclusion of his labors. He says, "it lies in the identity of the underlying (Christian) philosophy, and also in the identity of the method of approach which may be called *geistesgeschichtlich* (an untranslatable term)" (p. xii).

Furthermore, Professor Friedmann projects the first study in terms of general historical analysis; the second, as a concrete proof of his thesis concerning the intimate relation of Anabaptists and Pietists. Each study is related to, and supported by, the other, just as Mennonitism and Anabaptism are mutually interacting. The writer would have his title suggest: first, "the story of the unconsciously changing forms and the changing genius of the inner life as it develops from the Anabaptist into the Pietist pattern"; and, second, a record of the literary process, especially the development of Mennonite devotional literature (p. xiii).

Chapter II is a searching re-examination of the "Fundamental Characteristics of Anabaptism and Pietism." Anabaptism, from the first, stressed uncompromising discipleship of Christ, expressed through fellowship and love born out of, and dedicated to, Christian faith. It manifested immediate and continuing readiness to suffer for that faith in inescapable conflict with "the evil world order." Fellowship and suffering were the obvious hallmarks of the inner Christian experience that gave rise to them. The ebb and flow of these inward forces that generated readiness to suffer charted the rise and decline of true, unyielding Anabaptism. Where there was willingness to settle, by way of world withdrawal, for personal salvation at the expense of world challenging and Christ following—there the trend to Pietism was already under way.

Pietism, the author insists, is, in the larger sense, "a quiet conventicle-Christianity which is primarily concerned with the inner experience of

salvation and only secondarily with the expression of love toward the brotherhood, and not at all in a radical world transformation" (p. 11). For Anabaptism, spreading the gospel comes first, with all purely personal considerations relegated to the background. Pietism, Professor Friedmann avers, "is in its essence pure subjectivity." The cross spells assault on an evil world for the Anabaptist; it symbolizes inner, emotional experience for the Pietist. The Pietist inclines to make peace with the world as it is, on the basis of "inner perfecting of holiness." The Anabaptist still struggles to incarnate "concrete Christianity," however much bother for the world and cross-bearing for the Christ-follower this may entail (pp. 11-13).

In chapter X, Professor Friedmann further sharpens the focus with his "Retrospect: Contacts and Contrasts Between Anabaptism and Pietism." Sealed with the new birth in baptism, Anabaptists declare their willingness for the stern way of discipleship *(Nachfolge)*. Uncompromisingly and radically oriented to his final goal, the Kingdom of God, the Anabaptist sets out to change the world. A revolutionist for Christ, he engages any opposition the world may raise against him. The Pietist, meditating on personal depravity and the weight of sin, struggles for repentance *(Busskampf)*—with love a thing apart. Then follows the new birth with its reassurance of redemption, its sense of sure salvation, its liberating joy of the one blessed with the gifts of grace (pp. 73-74). His personal demons overcome, the Pietist seeks "edification and uplift, but not a change of the world" (p. 74).

Nachfolge Christi is, for the Anabaptist, the following of Christ in the concretized gospel sense. This characteristically gives place to *praxis pietatis*, "the practice of godliness," among Pietists. Whatever the vicissitudes of history, experience, and Christian interpretation, however, the following of Christ as it incarnates the call of the Lord and the Gospel continues to be the central Anabaptist concept. Loving mutuality and cross-wise suffering in conflict with the un-Christian world characterize this *Nachfolge*. How different from all this was the *praxis pietatis* as Dr. Friedmann describes it: "the independent individual conscience has become the (Pietist's) ultimate authority." The devotional literature of the two groups reflects this sharp cleavage even as it faithfully portrays the outlines of much that is common to the two traditions.

The experience of *Gemeinschaft* (fellowship) is basically different for

Pietists and Anabaptists. Pietist devotional conventicles were "gatherings of individualists, even though these individualists were ready to a limited extent to devote themselves to the group" (p. 76). Anabaptists, Dr. Friedmann thinks, achieved a truer practice of brotherly reciprocity and *koinonia.* Their *Gemeinshaft der Geisteinheit,* i.e., their "fellowship of the unity of the spirit," was all important, registering as it did a quality that rose triumphant over outside persecution and inward selfishness, alike (p. 77).

Stated thus, even aside from the author's admirably demonstrated cautions regarding over-generalization and his emphasis, also, on many common elements of Anabaptism and Pietism, Professor Friedmann's basic contentions are, nevertheless, clearly apparent. One cannot entirely reserve the feeling that some over-simplification still remains at the point of his minimizing the impact upon society of Pietistic community. Notwithstanding some such possibility, this reviewer is confident that Professor Friedmann's accent on the spiritually communalizing and socially regenerating aspects of Anabaptism is wholly justified. More and more the unfair charges of such early Reformers as Luther and Zwingli are being refuted by lately recovered and newly evaluated documents of the *Schwärmer.*

Dr. Friedmann carefully records the steadily rising crescendo of the Pietists' coming to terms with the world as it was. He sees the Anabaptists moving steadily across the years into proximate agreement with the Pietistic world compromise. Stressing intensively the close spiritual filiation of Anabaptism and Mennonitism, Dr. Friedmann fearfully spies the signs of Mennonitism's slipping from its earlier moorings of cross-bearing and world conflict into a safer harbor of Pietistic compromise with the age. Dr. Harold Bender, erudite historian of Mennonitism and translator of Dr. Friedmann's first study, echoes his concern: "May it (Professor Friedmann's book) also contribute, in accord with the author's devout wish, to a purification of modern Mennonitism from some of the foreign accretions which it has acquired through the centuries and thus to a recovery of more of the character and power of pristine Anabaptism" (p. ix).

"Das Gespräch zwischen einem Pietisten und einem Wiedertäufer" (chapter VII) is a documentary case study in the further differentiation of Pietist and Anabaptist. The entire first part of Dr. Friedmann's book is a vitally significant work, not only throwing light upon the often dis-

torted history of the "Sects," but also placing the entire Protestant Reformation in an often new and always clarified perspective.

Study II, "Mennonite Devotional Literature, 1600-1800," is a richly diversified examination of literary sources. One can only hint at its wealth of carefully analyzed books and manuscripts. Historiographical principles and methodological problems are competently handled from the very outset. The characteristic patterns of development enumerated in Study I are amply illustrated here in the literature of Mennonite and related movements. The devotional writings of Dutch, German, Swiss, and many other Mennonite groups are effectively studied from catechisms, confessions, Bible stories, sermon collections, prayer books, and prayer collections. Two concluding chapters stress non-Mennonite devotional literature employed by Mennonites and the spiritual resources and literary treasurers of American Mennonites. Scholarly notes, plates, charts of early sources, Bibliographies, and Index make this a book of glad surprises—a treasured work of authoritative reference and inspiring resourcefulness.

One source of never-ending delight in Study II is the author's and publisher's willingness to integrate comprehensive footnotes, many little known book titles, and countless digests of primary works into one vastly informing whole. Into this spiritual encyclopedia of historical-literary interpretation comes the rightful tribute to such superb collections and disciplined personnel as those of *The Mennonite Historical Society*, the *Mennonite Quarterly Review*, the Goshen College Library, and the *Mennonitisches Lexikon*. Dr. Friedmann's debt to his new-found Mennonite friends in America is acknowledged in every part of his book. The story of his own spiritual pilgrimage is written between the lines on every page. For one of "Dunker" origins like the reviewer, Dr. Friedmann's masterly handling of such diverse subjects as the Saur Press, the Ephrata movement, the "plain-church" issues of peace, war, and government, together with the full sweep of Pietist-Anabaptist literature is the cause of deep gratification. Works of such scholarly magnitude and positive intent addressed to the many neglected areas of Christian faith and life can serve as nothing else to recoup the withered outlines of much Christian history and the often sullied fairness of much ecclesiastical historiography.

Duke University

RAY C. PETRY

Sir Walter Ralegh: a Study in Elizabethan Skepticism. By ERNEST A. STRATHMANN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. ix, 292 pp. $3.75.

Was Sir Walter Ralegh a leader in an atheistical underground, a fifth column of Renaissance radicalism? What were the philosophical and religious thoughts of this fascinating and imaginative man? Did he, perhaps, resemble Mephistopheles, Faust, or Nathan the Wise? More or less reckless statements were made regarding him during his own lifetime, especially by the Jesuits, and have been made regarding him in ours, especially by college dons. In appraisal of his thought, the long intervening years have, on the whole, been more conservative and less sensational, but not of necessity more searching. The time for that legendary figure, the judicious historian, to appraise the troublesome evidence has been much overdue. Dr. Strathmann admirably supplies this want, and if his book leaves us less than wholly satisfied, such dissatisfaction is owing less to any defects on his part, great or small, than to gaps in the evidence that cannot be repaired. If his own contribution in the end is moderate, at least it should clear the air of much serious misrepresentation.

That the evidence for Ralegh's views should be unsatisfactory is almost inevitable. Atheists and rationalists are not as a rule of the martyr breed, and to publicize heretical opinions in philosophy or religion was a precarious practice in the England of Sir Walter. Who were the Elizabethan free thinkers, if any, and was Ralegh among them? These are hard questions. Certainly the Jesuits and many others who termed this Faustian an "atheist" and branded him as heretical did so with almost complete unscrupulousness, both moral and intellectual. Libels with political motives flew quite as fast in high places in 1600 as they do today. But realization of malignancy in Ralegh's enemies affords no help in describing his actual thoughts. Many of these certainly were buried in his own breast or revealed in conversation only to his intimates.

Strathmann suavely concludes that Ralegh was at all times almost entirely innocent of religious radicalism but was, at least, a consistent supporter of a comparatively free inquiry into secular matters: an experimenter in many scientific fields, much as he was an explorer in geography. His portrait tends to be static. Strathmann quotes, but scarcely approves, the familiar view that the young radical of those brilliant last

years of Elizabeth's reign became, when confined to the Tower under the tyranny of James, the sober philosopher who, apparently, writes his *History of the World*. The author's undisguised preference is at all times to deglamorize Ralegh, picturing him as largely conservative in religion, and a middle-of-the-road thinker in secular matters: a radical, perhaps, among Cambridge dons, but no British Machiavelli, no bad boy among the intellectually emancipated. It would be rash and ungracious to quarrel with either Dr. Strathmann's evidence or his interpretation of it. But behind his paragraphs lies the suspicion that, in such instances, the dramatic instinct is perhaps as good a guide, or even better, than the most approved methods of our old friend, the judicious historian.

Literally construed, nothing that Ralegh wrote or that was written of him by his contemporaries or has been written of him to the present day, even by so eloquent a scholar as Miss Ellis-Fermor, clearly justifies the view that he was a virulent disbeliever. But we should not confuse a literal reading of Ralegh's writing with his mercurial soul. The Elizabethans are to be judged as much by their creative literature as on their strictly historical record. Their poetry, which is roughly their dream world, shows minds poised on many levels, baffling, contradictory, schizophrenic. Each thinker tends to be his own Hamlet. Ralegh, who was, after all, a satirical poet as well as a sober historian, may or may not have harbored mephistopholean thoughts. He may have been merely jesting when, as a young man, he freely argued radical propositions, just as he may have been play-acting when, in later years, he commended orthodoxy. And the intermediate positions are almost infinite. Moreover, Dr. Strathmann is an historian to whom psychological speculation is out of bounds; it would be a kind of heresy on his pages. The thoroughly rationalistic reader is likely to be wholly satisfied with his rather sedate picture; but most of us do not answer that description. The reader who truly relishes Elizabethan literature and who, therefore, is allured by the contradictions of the human soul will launch into bold and delightful flights of speculation, leaving Ralegh's latest critic in the position of an airfield seen in a dwindling distance. Dr. Strathmann has a quiet, academic humor of his own, but it is neither Montaigne's, nor Rabelais,' nor Sir Walter's. A more searching appraisal of heretical tendencies in the Renaissance requires not only powers of scholarship

but grasp of poetry, and not only of tragedy, but of comedy. Although Dr. Strathmann's book is presumably the best existing study of Ralegh's mind, it by no means leaves the problem solved.

HENRY W. WELLS

Columbia University

Studies of Type-Images in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy. By MAUD BODKIN. London: Oxford University Press, 1951. xii, 184 pp. $2.50.

Changing Concepts of the Bible: a Psychological Analysis of Its Words, Symbols and Beliefs. By WERNER WOLFF. New York: Hermitage House, 1951. xiii, 463 pp. $5.00.

Miss Bodkin is obviously a deeply sincere and thoughtful, rather shy, old lady who has spent her life actively working in social problems and in the world of thought. She tells us in the first of the three essays of her book that as a child, in the eighteen-eighties, she was repelled by Protestant Christianity in its factual form: "That one should love God in order to escape punishment seemed to me, even then, too black an impossibility to be worth consideration." But she has now come to accept the basic teachings of Protestantism in the form of Jungian archetypes. Those who would like to do the same will be attracted and moved by her presentation. She is quite aware of the disastrous consequences of some archetypes, and so would help us select those which present God as goodness rather than power. She, like so many, keeps her faith in a good God by stripping him of infinite power and seeing him as a Force making for righteousness, a "divine intention," "harmonious fulfilment of potentialities discernible within an actual world full of conflict and frustration." With this type of God she can effect a real relationship in prayer, she firmly believes, and in constructive social activity, of which she quotes the TVA as an outstanding example. She has gone on to accept the Indian doctrine of reincarnation. Is there any guarantee that our experiences are really contacts with the Divine? she asks at the end, and answers the question affirmatively, but begins the affirmation with the provision "If we dare to believe." What we should believe in, she is sure, is the Power working for righteousness, not any one set of symbols or archetypes as necessary for all individuals. She is profoundly right in that humanity can hope at all only as it has hopes in something

greater than what any individual can operate; and it is also true that prayer, in the sense of communion with this something as a "Thou," is still the best formulation, archetype if you will, for the great majority of men. Men not ready to begin in this way, however, must be shown that other approaches to stability and hope are as available as the establishment of an I-Thou relation with a theistic divinity. Miss Bodkin leaves the door open for such people, but she has little help to give them.

The author's own approach she now goes on to illustrate in the two other essays which make up the book, one on the idea of divine incarnation, the other on the ideal of the Sage. The idea, or archetype, of divine incarnation she finds expressed in Yeats's poem, "The Second Coming," but to show its persistence in human thought she goes back to early Egyptian and Greek mysteries of nature, where man wanted to reproduce in himself, by identification, the divine incarnation. She quotes Milton, Browning, and Wordsworth as giving later expressions to this desire. But at once a conflict emerges, in that the incarnation of evil seems as real as that of good, and that, indeed, the two are so blended that Nietzsche's longing for the simultaneous incarnation of both in a single person was an obvious attempt at reconciling a persistent paradox. The divine incarnation is always threatened by the other, and the child born to save is always born to defeat and death. Human hope expresses itself steadily in the faith that the defeat is never complete, and that the divine keeps on always becoming incarnate in the clay, that clay whose triumph is always inevitable, but always in the end illusory.

The desire for a Sage, that is for access to a person of more than human understanding, she also traces to various parts of the world, in the attitude of the followers to Buddha and Jesus, the tradition of the king with divine wisdom, and looks for a modern counterpart, without full satisfaction, to the poets and novelists of our day. Oddly she does not point to the black side of this type of incarnation as illustrated in the tragedy which the ancients saw in the Usurper rather than the true king, one who was accepted by his subjects as having this gift when he did not have it at all. Usurpers have appeared in the modern deified men, "Leaders" of totalitarian states, who witness the strength of the desire for such leadership, the power it can give a society, and the tragedy of their misleading. But this is one of the virtues of the little book, that it starts one to thinking of many further examples, all of which Miss Bodkin obviously could not include.

The study is a valuable attestation to what Jung calls the archetypes as influencing men's desires and formulations, but in the end seems to me of value not as a demonstration but as a book of devotion. The difference between these two is that one permits organized evidence and the other is primarily directed at emotional satisfaction. Miss Bodkin has written a "true" book in the sense in which she defines truth: "Belief expressed in imagery awakening response." No one not previously inclined to theism in some form will become a theist from reading her essays, but they are delightful to read none the less.

The book of Werner Wolff seems to me very disappointing. It tries to be what was just referred to as a book of demonstration, but it does not demonstrate. He calls it a "psychological analysis" of the Bible's symbols and beliefs, but actually we have very little psychology, and a great deal of historical reconstruction without any sense of the techniques and limitations of history. Wolff says, in his dedicatory page, that he learned early that Philo of Alexandria was the first to discover the symbolic meaning of the Bible, and what Wolff has done is to become a modern Philo, at least in some respects. This volume, the first of five, is devoted to an exposition of the first chapter of Genesis, with a few verses from the second chapter, on the basic principle that the Bible is not merely a book of history or a collection of folk tales, but is the expression of a philosophy, and not merely of a philosophy but of a "metaphysics in the Aristotelian sense." The final editors of the Old Testament were men, he thinks, who scrutinized and censored every word, so that if they allowed any contradictions to stand it was by intent. The bibilical writers spoke in symbols, by which they transformed reality to their purpose, he says, a process "structurally not so very different from the transfiguration of reality by the modern mathematician and physicist."

This symbolic system is identical, Wolff assumes, not only through all the books of the Old Testament, but throughout the ancient world, or all civilizations, so that to illuminate a statement that God created light (before the celestial luminaries) Wolff can appeal at once to the symbol of divine light-power in Job, the Egyptians, Greeks, and Buddhists, namely lightning. So, when God said "Let there be light," he created lightning. God "broods" over the abyss, and one meaning of the word brood in Hebrew as in English is that of a hen's hatching eggs, and so it becomes legitimate to consider all the primal egg speculations of every civilization as immediately relevant to explain the Old Testa-

ment text. Now the function of the lightning becomes clear: God split the cosmic egg with his lightning. All this, and four hundred pages like this, are simply poured out as the true meaning of the Bible, in all of which my chief objection is to the process, or lack of process. Historical analysis of the books of the Old Testament has ended in the one universal conviction that these books, or the various strata in a given book, were written from highly divergent points of view, and that the construction of a biblical system for the books as a whole, if possible on large issues, is quite impossible in details. This Wolff does not refute but completely ignores, to match detail with detail from related, or utterly unrelated sources, and to declare their identity of interest without any sense of the meaning of historical analysis or relevance. It may be that when God "looked" at his creation and saw it was good we may understand the whole thought of antiquity of the power in the eye, the "evil eye," the spermatic eye, from all sorts and kinds of civilizations, but I cannot understand that all this is relevant simply by assertion. Symbolic exposition implies some methodology, and methodology in the modern sense Wolff understands no more than does his favorite Philo. Now I happen to love Philo, as has become public knowledge. He was a deeply sincere man who believed in the double meaning of Scripture, the verbal infallibility of the Septuagint, and that he could interpret the words in any one text by using words from any other. He believed that the best of Greek thought and religious practice could by this method of combination of texts be demonstrated to be the hidden meaning of the Bible. This demonstration he carried out in the interest of a profound piety which quite endears him to his students. If Philo is not to be read for the original meaning of Genesis, he is good reading for the devout and stimulating tour de force of his writings. Wolff is doing the same combination of words from every part of the Bible (and of the ancient world), with a very similar conviction of the overall consistency and verbal unanimity of the texts, but he is doing so, he says, in the interest of a psychological analysis of symbols and beliefs. It is when he fails to bring this psychological analysis out of his material that I am most disappointed. That factually many of his statements are pure fancy (as that the Egyptian *ankh* is primarily the bow from a shoelace, that it ties the person holding it to the "force of life," and that the Christian cross "developed from this concept,") is bad enough, but would be tolerable if psychological illumination came from it.

The problem of the history or interpretation of symbolism is indeed vexing. A sense of objective truth rarely goes with an interest in subjective values. We can, however, hope for light on the very obviously objective fact of symbols and their effect upon man only from one who combines these two intellectual gifts.

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH

Yale University

In Memoriam: the Way of a Soul. By ELEANOR BUSTIN MATTES. New York: Exposition Press, 1951. 128 pp. $3.00.

The present generation has witnessed a revival of interest in Tennyson, but as Dr. Mattes has noted, there is still much diversity of opinion among the critics concerning the merit and quality of *In Memoriam,* largely because of the ambiguities in the poem, many of which exist because a poem that was written over a period of seventeen years was arranged for publication by Tennyson in a chronological order intended to represent the three-year period following the death of Arthur Hallam. In this study, Dr. Mattes reconstructs the way in which *In Memoriam* probably developed and notes major influences which shaped it from 1833 to 1850, the years during which the individual sections were written.

Since she believes that *In Memoriam* was inevitably affected by early religious impressions, she examines those briefly in Part One. Alfred's father, George Tennyson, a rector in the Anglican Church, was conscientious in the performance of his pastoral duties, but his continual brooding over his disinheritance, intermittent quarrels with his father and brother, and excessive drinking finally led to a mental and physical breakdown. In view of the poet's distaste for the doctrine of eternal punishment, it is of interest to note that George Tennyson repudiated this doctrine. Alfred's mother was a saintly woman whose letters reveal her faith to have been simple and sure; but his aunt was a strict Calvinist, believing in predestination to damnation as well as to salvation.

During these early years Tennyson became thoroughly familiar with the Bible, and his imagination was kindled by philosophic idealism and the recent findings of astronomy. Apparently, however, by the time he went to Cambridge, he had made no attempt to evaluate or integrate these various elements of his background.

At Cambridge Tennyson was associated with the "Apostles" and became fast friends with Hallam, whose warmth and serenity of spirit were most attractive to the moody poet. Hallam believed that the fundamental truths were the reality of love and the reality of evil. In the "Theodicaea Novissima," an essay which he probably read to the Cambridge Apostles in 1831, Hallam attempted to reconcile these problems. Dr. Mattes believes that acquaintance with the "Theodicaea Novissima" "suggests that Tennyson's inability to share his dead friend's faith was a contributing factor in the spiritual confusion *In Memoriam* reflects, but one which the poem itself nowhere discloses."

In Memoriam, of course, is more than an expression of personal grief; it is an attempt to answer some of the distressing problems of the Victorian age. The author believes that, in order to understand the problems which troubled Tennyson and to determine from which sources he drew his solutions, it is necessary to trace the sequence of the sections as he may have written them. This is the procedure that she follows, then, in Part Two, which seeks "to reconstruct the way of Tennyson's soul from 1833 to 1850."

In the early sections Dr. Mattes finds sources for Tennyson's arguments for immortality in the writings of Wordsworth and Hallam and in Isaac Taylor's *Physical Theory of Another Life.* Tennyson's belief in immortality and in the eternal quality of love was sorely tried, however, when in 1837 he read Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology.* But by 1839 Tennyson knew Carlyle, and he found in Carlyle's version of transcendentalism arguments which he developed in the later elegies, in which he wrestled with geology's denial of God and immortality. The poet found further reassurance in J. F. W. Herschel's *A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy* and, strangely enough, in Robert Chambers' *Vestiges of Creation.* Dr. Mattes is of the opinion that Tennyson was encouraged by the optimistic view of development presented in this book. Finally, she sees in the Prologue, dated 1849, the influence of F. D. Maurice's belief in the strong, loving Son of God as the giver of life and the conqueror of death.

Dr. Mattes believes that the strong appeal of *In Memoriam* to the nineteenth century can be explained on the ground that the age "wanted to reconcile the current scientific theories as to man's past history and his future prospects with belief in his special status and glorious destiny as a child of the loving God," and that *In Memoriam* professed

to show a way of effecting this reconciliation. The spiritual confusion of the Victorians in a new scientific age has its counterpart, as Dr. Mattes suggests, in another "new" scientific age. "And, beyond this specific contemporary appeal," she writes, "there is a living quality in Tennyson's record of the way of his soul."

Much has been written about this aspect of Tennyson's life as well as about the famous elegy, but Dr. Mattes has made a noteworthy contribution to Tennyson scholarship by her systematic chronological approach to the interpretation of *In Memoriam*.

FRANCES E. WHITE

Asbury College

Christ and Culture. By H. RICHARD NIEBUHR. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951. vi, 259 pp. $3.50.

Contemporary Christian thinking about social ethics has been brought back to a fundamental question which is partly sociological and partly theological. This is the problem of living in and by culture while, at the same time, engaging in radical criticism of that culture. The author of this book is both a sociologist and a theologian, and thus specially equipped to examine this problem.

Professor Niebuhr identifies five possible attitudes which have characterized Christian ethical thinking: (1) setting Christ over against culture in a revolt against all social patterns as corrupt; (2) assimilating Jesus Christ to cultural standards of judgment so that he becomes an epitomization of cultural values; (3) seeing Christ as the bearer of supra-social truth who enters into culture and raises it beyond itself through his own transcendence; (4) accepting the dual authority of Christ and culture so that the Christian lives under two moralities in acute inner conflict which can never be resolved in history; and (5) acknowledging culture to be a part of God's creation, yet a part debased by man's sin so that divine redemption is necessary to bring society back into conformity with God's will.

These five attitudes are carefully examined in terms of their historical antecedents and their theological presuppositions. The first is typified by Tertullian in the ancient world, and Tolstoy in the modern. It is "a necessary but inadequate position," inadequate because it must inevitably deny its premise by acting within the framework of a culture

since all Christians are first human, and yet necessary because it issues a perennial challenge against the tendency of Christians to trim Christ down to fit their cultural standards when these standards themselves need to be transformed.

The history of the subordination of Christ to culture is seen in ancient Gnosticism, in the medieval Abelard, in early modern rationalism, and in Albrecht Ritschl. And yet Niebuhr is careful to point out that their mode of thinking also leads them to select aspects of culture that are consistent with the spirit of Christ, and thus, by proportionate emphasis, to encourage these better features of social life. In this way they have done much to enrich social thinking with Christian insights and to draw secular idealists into fruitful co-operation with Christian reformers. But the attitude is dangerous because it tries to make Christ socially and intellectually "respectable" and thus to dilute the power of his challenge.

The attempt to conserve the values in both the preceding approaches leads to a synthesis in which the inherent possibilities and values of culture are brought to their fulfilment through the grace of God revealed in Christ. Law and gospel, reason and revelation, morals and religion are here harmonized in an inclusive Christian faith. Exemplars of this tradition are Clement of Alexandria, Thomas Aquinas, Joseph Butler, but Niebuhr seems to think that this position is "absent from modern Christianity." The judgment is, in my opinion, wrong, for I think he would find it to be the attitude of a host of contemporary liberals. In any case, he objects to the synthesists because their Christ becomes involved in historical relativities and in institutionalism.

The fourth group, the "dualists," see a contrast between God and man, rather than between Christian and unbeliever, but insist that the individual has to live with both. He lives perennially in personal tension and in intellectual paradox, as we see in Paul and Luther, in Kierkegaard and the author's brother Reinhold. This view lends vitality and force to Christian ethics as well as a pragmatic realism, but it invites disregard of law and may reinforce social conservatism.

Distinct from all these is the "conversionist" view: that the Kingdom of God, though not realized is already present, that redemption is now at work in creation, that the world is not intrinsically evil but perversion of the good, and the world of culture exists within the world of grace. We find this position taken in the Fourth Gospel, Augustine, and F. D. Maurice.

At the end of this survey Niebuhr refuses to choose between these various solutions of the problem. To attempt "the Christian answer" would, he feels, be to "usurp the Lordship of Christ" and to do violence to the liberty of Christian men and to the unconcluded history of the church in culture." Keenly aware of the relativity of all human judgments, he yet insists on "obedience to the command of the Absolute." He criticizes Kierkegaard for the individualism of his existential thinking, and calls for a "social existentialism." "The Christian is a member of a company which has a history of relations to him and to Christ," and his freedom is limited by the past which provides his values and powers, and by the unknown future consequences of his own actions. But he acts "with reasoning faithfulness."

This is an evasive answer to the whole problem of the book, for it furnishes no criteria for evaluating the various solutions surveyed. It brings reflection on culture back to the vague generalization that we must be true to Christ, without telling us how to make this commitment a basis for rational judgment between social alternatives. It has the same abstract quality as Kant's categorical imperative, and offers little guidance for practical decisions. One could wish that the theologian in Niebuhr had made room for the sociologist, so that the two might together benefit by the dialogue of basic religious faith with empirical analysis of society. Until this is done the rich body of insights from his brilliant historical survey cannot be exploited satisfactorily for the determination of Christian policy in the face of the desperate social needs of our time.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

The University of Pennsylvania

The Supreme Identity. By ALAN W. WATTS. New York: Pantheon Books, 1950. 204 pp. $3.50.

This book presents a clear and profound exposition of oriental metaphysics and such Christian philosophical mysticism as is derived mainly from Greek sources. The Vedanta, Buddhism, Taoism, the teachings of the Sufis, and Neoplatonism differ from each other, but they are alike in having as their basis the doctrine of *The Supreme Identity*. Because of our extraverted and objective modern Western way of thinking, this philosophy is generally misunderstood. Interpre-

ters like Alan Watts are needed to introduce us to a great and historically important approach to truth. In his previous work, *Behold The Spirit,* Alan Watts treated this type of thought as something which could be integrated with Christianity, but in this book the two appear as belonging to quite different realms and are related only by analogy.

Since metaphysical knowledge, the realization of the Supreme Identity, is quite different from any philosophy or theology based on reason or dogmatic, historical, or sacramental ideas, an account of it makes this book appear at first sight difficult and even obscure. Yet this obscurity is paradoxically due to the very simplicity of the concept. The following attempt to outline the main argument of Alan Watts suffers, like the book itself, from the necessity of making what is actually simple in experience seem complicated and difficult because of its indescribability.

Though religion, the author maintains, contains the nearest approach to a principle of unity so badly needed in the Western World, its doctrines cannot stand on their own merits. Only metaphysical knowledge, that is the realization and immediate experience of Ultimate Reality, can be a principle of unity, for the world of external objects is united only by its inner ground. Christianity, which offers an analogy of metaphysical knowledge, is ineffective without the support of this knowledge. Modern academic philosophy is even more confused and ineffective. The prevailing philosophy of our age denies or ignores the existence of anything outside the realm of contingency and relativity. Hence our age is unstable and lacking in unity.

Metaphysical knowledge of the Infinite Reality is distinct from the knowledge of religious objects, but not in conflict with it. Reality, because it is the ground of man's consciousness, is not an object set over against other objects. Reality embraces all objects as a mirror embraces all forms without being identified with any. The infinite is not opposed to the finite, for by definition it includes the finite. Because the infinite can become finite while remaining infinite, it includes both unity and multiplicity. This is the Vedantic doctrine of non-duality *(advaita).* The monism of pantheism, on the other hand, excludes the reality of finite things. In the Vedanta, and in Buddhism, the supreme ideal is not, as is often supposed, total absorption of the individual in an undifferentiated oneness. Because eternity includes time, nothing is lost in Nirvana.

The religious goal of salvation is distinct from the metaphysical goal of realization. The essence of realization is the discovery that the conscious Self, the ultimate knower in man, is substantially identical with the Infinite. Man as Self is the infinite in the act of identifying itself with the finite ego.

The doctrine of the Supreme Identity does not come within the sphere either of science or religion. Both science and religion deal with the known, not the ultimate Knower, or they confuse the Knower with the known. The conscious Self, the supra-individual basis of man's consciousness, transcends thought. Because consciousness in man is continuous with and identical with the ALL-consciousness, we know Reality intimately and immediately.

Metaphysical knowledge of the Supreme Identity solves the problem of evil. Theology is baffled by this problem because it makes the distinction between good and evil absolute and not relative, and so turns the relative into an absolute. By placing evil in the relative world, it is found to be evil only from a temporal, not an eternal, point of view. But to say that good and evil are relative is not to render the distinction valueless. Ultimately they contribute to a single harmony. This, like some other truths, is dangerous doctrine, but, if based on a living experience of union with the infinite, it abolishes the fear, insecurity, and pride which underly all evil action. Realization of the Supreme Identity unites us with our fellows just as surely as ego-centricity separates us from them.

The highest manifestation of Infinite Reality is religious myth and symbolism. Symbols are essential instruments in the search for realization. The "Christ-story" is a projection and a symbol, but this is not inconsistent with its historicity. Objections to Christian claims may be made on historic grounds, but not on metaphysical grounds. Manifestation of the Infinite in history or myth takes place in two phases, involution in which the Self identifies itself with the separate ego expressing distinction, and evolution in which the Self "recollects" its own true nature.

I cannot say: "I can attain realization" if by "I" is meant my ego. The successful search for the Self is moved only by the Self. Prayer and meditation, yoga practice, detachment or letting go of consciousness

and living in the eternal Now are methods of trying to attain realization which are ineffective when inspired by ego-centric motives. These are all different from the religious aim of contemplating God as a person and an object of knowledge. God as the Self is known interiorily as inmost Subject. The subjective realm is not opposed to the objective in the way that objects are mutually exclusive of each other, hence the perfect compatibility of realization with everyday experience.

This brief outline does not do justice to a work closely packed with penetrating insights, clarified by unique and original comparisons. It is difficult to accept the argument without combating a Christian and Western bias toward a more realistic view of history and the objective world. If religion and ethics are to be partially saved by reducing them to a relative status as symbols of a deeper Reality, could we not save them more fully by elevating them to the absolute? The concept of religion can be so broadened as to include the experience of the ultimate and the concept of goodness extended to include the absolute harmony of light and darkness. The author is in danger of being caught in the same confusion of which he accuses the theologians, but, while they have made an absolute of the relative, he finds it difficult to avoid making a relative of the absolute. If realization is a goal, it is a good goal or no goal at all. The path from the relative to the absolute has been well charted by the great mystics, but the way from the absolute to the relative is "a path way which no fowl knoweth and which the vulture's eye hath not seen."

This is no real criticism but a manipulation of words in a field where words are inadequate. This book goes a long way toward helping the reader to grasp not only the higher reaches of oriental philosophy, if "philosophy" it can be called, but also a very important element in our Christian religion. The author is right in holding that this element does not logically mix with the remainder, and that this incompatibility is the source of much confusion in Christian theology. But, just because we are concerned here with a book and not an ineffable experience, we are still in the world of confusion.

HOWARD H. BRINTON

Pendle Hill

BOOK NOTES

Das heilige Mahl im Glauben der Völker. By F. Bammel. Güttersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag, 1950. 199 pp. DM 19.

This is an interesting attempt to classify the various types of religious meals in ancient and modern faiths. The first part, which the author calls "empirical typology," deals with the relation of religious meals to human existence—their connection with various natural and supernatural capacities: long life, sexuality, spiritual power, ethical and religious purity, and so on. The second part, which he calls "comparative typology," discusses the essentially common elements and differences in the forms of religious meals.

The author covers a wide field in an informed way and appends an elaborate table indicating the results of his enquiry. While one may not be altogether impressed by his method or by his sub-headings when these grow unduly abstract, one will certainly profit from the material he has treated.

C. C. R.

The Dhammapada. With Introductory Essays, Pāli Text, English Translation, and Notes by S. Radhakrishnan. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. viii, 194 pp. $2.50.

This fresh translation of a famous ethical classic in Buddhist canonical literature is presented as a contribution to world understanding. Dr. Radhakrishnan brings his rich store of Indian wisdom to the task. All 423 aphoristic verses of the Pāli text he clarifies ably for the modern mind. For each he gives the original form, provides a faithful English rendering and, where necessary, adds comment on special words or phrases. At times, to show universality of a saying, he quotes some apt parallel from the Upanishads, the Gospels, Homer, the Old Testament, the Bhagavadgita, the Imitation of Christ, or Gandhi. At times he adds his own reflective comment. The whole is accurate, discriminating, wise.

Of the two introductory essays, one is devoted to a brief account of the Dhammapada text itself; the other is devoted to Gautama the Buddha, recounting the few known facts of his life and analyzing at length, and with philosophic acumen, the basic concepts of his teaching. In the latter, the author shows how the Buddha's doctrine stems from the Upanishads. Conviction of "the supremacy of the ethical," however, led the Buddha to deny older conceptions of an unchanging and unchangeable self, and to stress the point that the truly worthful self must be built by effort and discipline. The goal of religious life is seen as *nirvāṇa,* a state of spiritual serenity "attainable in this life and compatible with intellectual and social work." It is "unconditioned life of the spirit," "peace and rest in the bosom of the eternal." Radhakrishnan's mature appreciation of Gautama's significance is impressive:

> We find in Gautama the Buddha, in powerful combination, spiritual profundity, moral strength of the highest order, and a discreet intellectual reserve. He is one of

those rare spirits who bring to men a realization of their own divinity and make the spiritual life seem adventurous and attractive, so that they may go forth into the world with a new interest and a new joy at heart. . . . His true greatness stands out clearer and brighter as the ages pass. . . . He is one of those few heroes of humanity who have made epochs in this history of our race, with a message for other times as well as their own (pp. 56 f.).

For both scholarly excellence of the translation and profound insights of the essay on Gautama the Buddha this little book deserves wide reading.

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

Rubaiyat-i-Sarmad. Edited and translated by FAZL MUHMUD ASIRI. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950, xiii, xxxiv, 57, 51 pp. Rs. 6.

Sarmad is the Sufi name of a Perso-Indian mystical poet, Muḥammad Sa'īd, who was put to death at Delhi in 1660, during the reign of Aurungzib, as an innovator and a heretic. He was originally of Kashan in Persia, apparently of Jewish origin. He is said to have learned the Old Testament by heart and prepared himself to be a Rabbi, but he studied also the Christian books, and then the Islamic books, and under the teaching of the savants, Mulla Ṣadraddin of Shiraz and Abu'l-Qāsim Findarski, both of whom died in the year 1640, he not only acquired an excellent knowledge of literary Persian and Arabic but became a Muslim. In 1631 he left Persia for India, settling in Tattha in Sindh, where he fell in love with a boy, Abhay Chand, an experience which led to his abandoning the world and taking up the dervish life. Followed by the boy he moved to Lahore and then to Hyderabad in the Deccan, but finally established himself in Delhi. Both the Frenchman Bernier and the Venetian Marucci saw him in Delhi and comment on the naked ascetic who was affected neither by the threats nor by the promises of Aurungzib. He seems to have become there a close friend of the Prince Dara Shikuk, and when the struggle between that Prince and Aurungzib ended in the former's execution, it was probably Sarmad's connection with the Prince rather than the dervish nakedness and heretical statements charged against him that led to his arrest and death.

To this reviewer Sarmad seems a better poet than mystic. The Sufism of his verses never rises beyond the reframing of a number of the usual clichés of Sufi verse, and even they seem often to be half-hearted. He does, however, have considerable skill in versification. The present volume presents a text, translation, and Introduction. The text still needs much attention. F. M. Asiri has not based it on any new MSS, for he was unable to discover any, but on the Rubā'īs printed along with those of other poets in two Indian lithographs, adding what he was able to cull from other anthologies and literary works. He has included the text of what fragments he found of Sarmard's other verses, but has translated only the Rubā'iyāt. The English idiom often breaks down rather badly, especially where the translator has attempted to use archaic forms

whose grammar he obviously does not understand, but in general he renders the text very well, and has done a good service to all students of Islamic mysticism by making available material that was otherwise quite inaccessible, and which contributes in no small way to our understanding of that side of seventeenth century Islam in India.

A. J.

Near Eastern Culture and Society. Edited by T. Cuyler Young. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1951. x, 250 pp. $4.00.

This book, the result of the co-operation of several authors, constitutes what the editor wants it to be—a valuable contribution to the understanding of Near Eastern culture and society. The aim is achieved not only by the high standard of the individual essays, but also by its outline, which starts from the Western outlook on the Near East, from there proceeds to describe the reaction of the Near Eastern countries and their views of the West, to complete the picture by an analysis of the interaction between West and East in the main Near Eastern countries. A sound balance is maintained between the articles of a mere retrospective character reviewing critically the history and progress in Islamic studies, and the contemporary problems of the Islamic world and its main representatives. Richard Ettinghausen, in his essay on Islamic art and archeology, effectively supported by well selected illustrations, emphasizes art as the "ambassador of good will." Gustave E. von Grunebaum, reviewing the study of Arabic literature, arrives at the interesting conclusion that the reason of the stagnation since medieval times of Arabic literature must be found in that need of "redefining the universe" which, in the West, sprang as a dynamic force from modern science and philosophy. Arthur J. Arberry tells the history of Western knowledge of Persian literature and ends with an impressive and comprehensive program of Iranian studies. George Sarton's study, which condenses the history and role of Arab science—and with that his own work—into the small space of a few stimulating pages, is paralleled by Edwin E. Calverly's essay on Islamic religion, written in a deeply humane spirit. The editor's most informative essay on Iran's domestic and international situation, and those corresponding on Turkey by Abdulhak Adnan-Adivar and Lewis V. Thomas, suggest the wish to have them complemented by equally instructive articles at least on Egypt, Iraq, and Arabia. However, this lack is partly made good by Constantine K. Zurayk's essay on "the national and international relations of the Arab states" and H. A. R. Gibb's concluding statements, "Near East perspective: the present and the future," both of which throw into clear relief what they believe should be the mutual attitude towards each other of the West and the Near East, and the form and extent of their co-operation.

William Haas

The Wisdom of the Talmud. By Ben Zion Bokser. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. xx, 180 pp. $3.75.

The scope of Rabbi Bokser's book is broader than its title. Bokser sketches as a background for his discussion of the Talmudic wisdom itself a picture of the thought-world out of which the Talmud arose. The reader is led back to the period of the Babylonian exile and shown the emergence of the Scribes. Their work and that of their successors, the Pharisees, is set forth in a framework of Jewish history before the author presents the work of the Rabbinic leaders whose ideas and controversies make up the Talmud. This historical introduction makes the appearance of the Talmud comprehensible by demonstrating the continuity of a tradition of interpretation in the Jewish world. Within this tradition, it has always been recognized that "The Bible requires supplementation." The Talmud is one—perhaps the most important, nevertheless only one—of a series of supplements produced by the Wise among the Jews during the long history of their people. However great the respect shown by the Jews to the Book of Books itself, or to its Talmudic supplement, Judaism in its major varieties is not now and has never been either a Biblical Fundamentalism or a Talmudic Fundamentalism.

Bokser's chapters on the Talmud—its theology, social ethics, personal morality, jurisprudence, and human wisdom—furnish a sound, brief introduction to the content of the Talmud. A good deal of Talmudic lore is quoted in fragments throughout the book, which serves, for this reason, to familiarize the reader with the idiomatic flavor of Rabbinic discussions. All in all, this is a handy little book which should be both adaptable to and suitable for a wide variety of uses.

J. L. B.

Seder R. Amram Gaon. Part I. By David Hedegård. Lund: Lindstedt, 1951. xl, 202, 84 pp. Kr. 40.

This work is a valuable contribution to the study of the Jewish liturgy. Amram held office as the head of the famous rabbinical academy in Sura, Babylonia, for some eighteen years, during the latter half of the ninth century. As the leading authority in Jewish law, it was to him that a Spanish congregation had turned with a request for "the order of prayers and blessings for the entire year." In compliance, Amram sent them a completely edited order of the Jewish liturgy, for Sabbaths and festivals as well as week-days, with various Talmudic passages bearing on the liturgy. Thus was the earliest collection of Jewish prayers produced. In his present volume Hedegård offers a careful edition of the text of R. Amram's work, with an annotated English translation and introduction.

Hedegård's study was undertaken in order to serve the needs of a better understanding of the Jewish background of Christianity. Specifically, his pur-

pose was to understand "Jewish prayer as a background to the study of prayer in the New Testament." He assumes that since Amram's work was presented, as Amram put it, "in accordance with the tradition which is in our possession," it must be presumed to go back to a much older period. Yet how far can we trace back the tradition of Amram? The author recognizes that the destruction of the Temple in the first century affected the development of the liturgy, but he does not reckon sufficiently with this and other facts which separate the time of Jesus from the time of Amram. Conceding that Amram's material is much older, it would yet be rash to assume that it is a faithful index of the Jewish liturgy in the time of Jesus.

Hedegård's use of the original sources also leaves something to be desired. Relying on a misinterpretation of a Midrashic text by Odeberg *(Tillbaka til Bibeln,* p. 70. Cf. Gen. R. 13:2), he comes to the conclusion that prayers for rain and for a good harvest were frowned on by the rabbis who looked upon these as a "yielding to lower instincts." Such prayers were offered by all the great rabbis of the Talmud. Nor is there evidence to support the author's contention that Judaism disapproved "of the individual making request for his own personal needs in his prayer." The Talmud abounds in prayers for personal need quoted in the name of various individuals. While the formalized liturgy tended to make prayer flow in a prescribed groove and direct itself toward collective and universal needs, the individual remained free to improvise personal prayers, in accordance with his own needs. Hedegård's study is clearly marred by an over-dependence on secondary sources.

This work was submitted as a doctoral dissertation in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Lund. Despite its shortcomings, it is a helpful addition to the growing literature in English on the development of the Jewish liturgy.

BEN ZION BOKSER

The Earth is the Lord's. By ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL. With wood engravings by ILYA SCHOR. New York: Henry Schuman, 1950. 109 pp. $2.50.

The Earth is the Lord's is subtitled "the inner world of the Jew in East Europe." The *outer* world of the East European Jews was a world of sometimes incredible squalor, poverty, and misery. In rare instances this squalidity was deliberately embraced; more often it was thrust upon the Jewish people by their medieval and unsympathetic milieu. The culminating indignity of the centuries came in our own days, when the Nazi madness exterminated two thirds of the nine and a half million Jews of Eastern Europe. The outer world of the Jew in East Europe is no more.

Professor Heschel's concern is that the inner and spiritual values in Judaism developed during the history of Jewish living in East Europe shall not likewise perish from the earth. With a poetic fervor, in a language of beauty, he

distills the essence of spirituality out of the everyday life and attitudes of East European Jewry. Heschel represents a new strain in interpreting this aspect of Jewish history. At best earlier western writers on this theme have found the life of the East European Jew not altogether engulfed in superstition. Heschel, writing as one of the new irrationalists (Judaism has them as well as Christianity), finds that "in this period our people attained the highest degree of inwardness. I feel justified in saying that it was the golden period in Jewish history, in the history of the Jewish soul" (p. 10).

The literary beauty and expressiveness of Heschel's text has been married by the publisher to the beautiful and expressive wood engravings of Ilya Schor. Text and illustrations here form an organic unity; jointly they give their support to the thesis advanced by Heschel. So overwhelmingly effective is the artistry of the joint venture that the poetic truth of Heschel's claim is granted by the reader, even when he has doubts about its literal truth.

J. L. B.

Lactantius' Epitome of the Divine Institutes. Edited and translated with commentary, by E. H. Blakeney. London: S.P.C.K., 1950, xiv, 175 pp. 11*s.*

This is a useful volume. It contains the Latin text of the *Epitome* with a good translation. The text used is that of Routh (1845), but emendations by later scholars such as Brandt (in the Vienna Corpus) have been incorporated. The notes and brief commentary are helpful and accurate. The book is prepared with the intent that the *Epitome* should be read as a text-book in schools and colleges. The Latin is eloquent and the material of general interest. Lactantius represents the point of view of an educated layman, interested in affirming the simplest Christian dogmas and in combatting the current philosophies which he had found so wanting in his own quest for truth.

C. C. R.

Vom himmlischen Fleisch Christi. By H. J. Schoeps. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1951. 80 pp. DM $3.80.

Dr. Schoeps, known to us for his excellent study of Jewish Christianity, here presents a brief survey of the docetic or semi-docetic doctrine of Christ's heavenly body. He writes with clarity and accuracy, surveying the course of the doctrine from its Gnostic origins. He treats its development in Apollinaris and the Monophysites, in left-wing Reformers such as Hoffmann and Franck, and carries the story down to some seventeenth century thinkers, e.g., Nicholaus Teting and Paul Felgenhauer. Into his monograph of eighty pages the author has compressed the richness of wide and deep study; and in his analysis of the significance of the doctrine (pp. 18-24) he shows an incisive judgment.

C. C. R.

From Constantine to Julian. By HANS LIETZMANN. Translated by BERTRAM LEE WOOLF. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. 340 pp., $5.50.

This volume, the third of Professor Lietzmann's four-volume work on the history of the early Church, maintains the high standards of accuracy and historical insight established by the author in the first two volumes. Here is a fine study of one of the most significant periods in the history of the Christian Church, a period which included the cessation of persecution, the elevation of Christianity to the status of a legal religion, and the consequent trials and tribulations of the Church as a factor in the political machinations of the Constantine and post-Constantine eras. One marvels at the copious amount of material which the author has been able to set forth clearly within the limits of 340 pages. Not only has the thought of the Church been examined, but there are also able discussions of contemporary pagan literature.

Probably the most stimulating chapter is the one dealing with the Arian controversy. Not all will agree with Lietzmann's description of *homöousios* as "an omnibus word frequently on the lips of the unlettered, but eager and quick-witted, members of the laity . . . ," or as a "protest against any thought-out doctrine of an hypostasis (p. 119)." Further, the author's thesis that Athanasius' interest lay primarily in the realm of Church power politics does not do justice to the important role which the Bishop of Alexandria played in salvaging a Christian solution to the problem of Christology.

The book is marred by the many errors and slips due, in great part, to the poor quality of the translation. A list of corrections is given on page 13, but it is not exhaustive. Hippolytus' *Chronicle* was not written in A. D. 324! A "communion service for catechumens" (pp. 298, 305) is a contradiction in terms. The inconsistency in rendering proper names is confusing: Maximinus Daia (p. 60) and Maximinus Daja (p. 68); Lucian (p. 107) and Lucianos (p. 109); Filocalus (p. 238) and Philocalus (p. 240). Some of the spelling errors ought to be corrected: Meletius for Miletius (p. 103); Abyssinian for Abessinian (p. 304).

Despite these defects, however, Professor Lietzmann's book is one of the highest value. It is really the only good, comprehensive, up-to-date work in English on the history of the early Church written from the Protestant side.

ALAN W. CARLSTEN

Innocent III, Church Defender. By CHARLES EDWARD SMITH. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951. vii, 203 pp. $3.50.

This compressed study rests upon a broad basis of research. It consists largely of a recital of incidents recorded in the papal letters, which amply illustrate the policies and motives of Innocent the Great, and the prevalent lay and clerical violence and corruption against which he struggled. The incidents, which are often lurid, bring to realization the terrific perils in which the Church stood through attacks upon the clergy and abuses practiced by them.

Innocent pressed for action against clerical malefactors who tried to protect themselves by legal devices, and did not hesitate to urge severity in the punishment of simoniacs and extortioners. His effort to bring regularity in episcopal elections and the tenure of benefices encountered such obstacles as forgery of letters of authorization, the appointment of clerics below canonical age or of illegitimate birth, and the obligation to demote senile or infirm prelates. Conditions in the monasteries called for vigorous correction. Unworthy abbots, disobedient monks, violators of monastic communities from without, and economic disorders, demanded vigilance and firmness. The attempt to suppress clerical concubinage and incontinence was sometimes stoutly resisted by priests and prelates. Dr. Smith calls attention to the importance in Innocent's general policy of the results of the Fourth Crusade, and of his project of a new crusade against the Turks. He was, at the same time, attempting to strengthen, and to Latinize, the churches of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland. While he was ardently promoting and arranging for the projected crusade, Innocent suddenly died, and the whole effort was abandoned.

While not a complete account of Innocent's pontificate, this book sheds a great deal of light upon his problems and aims, and is written with commendable fairness and good judgment.

J. T. M.

Early Medieval Philosophy. By George B. Burch. New York: King's Crown Press, Columbia University, 1951. vii, 142. $2.25.

Excellent, small, scholarly volumes, are, unfortunately, always few and far between, and this is especially true of works in medieval philosophy. Professor Burch has turned out such a volume, and it should prove invaluable both for the general reader and the student of philosophical thought. Basing his studies on original works, the author presents brief but pithy expositions and interpretations of the thought of Erigena, Anselm, Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Issac of Stella; a group of thinkers constituting early medieval philosophy, a period regarded by Professor Burch as "a sort of neo-pre-Socratic period." The volume is fitted out with a bibliography which indicates original sources as well as secondary works in French, German, and English.

John E. Smith

St. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts. Selected and translated with notes by Thomas Gilby. New York: Oxford University Press. 1951. xxii, 405. $3.00.

This is a very useful volume of selections, ably translated and provided with a lively introduction by the editor and translator. Dr. Gilby has very neatly carried out the task of selecting and arranging, in the order of subjects treated in the *Summa Theologica,* over 1100 passages from the five types of

works written by St. Thomas. Although approximately sixty percent of the passages are from the *Summa Theologica,* the volume is intended to present the "philosophy" or "natural wisdom" of Aquinas as the "rational foundation" necessary for an understanding of his theology. Of particular value for English readers are the passages, many translated for the first time, from works not before available, including the early commentaries on Boethius and Dionysius, the commentaries on Aristotle, the disputations and the *Opuscula* numbered according to the catalogue of Mandonnet.

JOHN E. SMITH

Piers Plowman and Scriptural Tradition. By D. W. ROBERTSON, JR., and BERNARD F. HUPPÉ. x, 259 pp. Princeton University Press, 1951. $4.00.

The last twenty years have witnessed a strongly renewed interest in William Langland's *Piers Plowman,* comparable to the revival, at the dawn of the Romantic Age nearly two hundred years ago, of Chaucer's poetry. For this much increased interest there are several explanations, three of which are uppermost. The new scholasticism of the twentieth century turns to a poem second only to Dante's in embodying scholastic teaching, to by far the finest philosophical and religious poem produced in medieval England. Its apparent championship of the common man as against his oppressors, secular or religious, has endeared the book to modern democrats and socialists; *Piers Plowman* is one of the few fields which Communist and Catholic view with like satisfaction. Thirdly, even the lovers of "pure poetry" today admire a work once rejected by the aristocracy of letters. In their new interest in unrhymed, alliterative verse, in homely diction, and in a sober but impressive symbolism, recent poets, such as W. H. Auden, have highly extolled Langland. His vogue has been considerable in America, far greater in England. Even French and German scholarship has by no means neglected him; and countries much further removed culturally from England and America than France and Germany have not completely overlooked him. A serious interpretation of Langland is almost sure to repay close attention.

The unusual volume by D. W. Robertson, Jr., and Bernard F. Huppé, who may be said to represent our revived scholasticism, contains much valuable matter, yet is at least debatable in its form, spirit, and conception. In brief, this is pure exegesis, creeping page by page, or, to accept the original allegory, mile by mile across the ample landscape of the medieval work. Our two devoted guides can almost be checked by a speedometer in their laborious pilgrimage from Passus One to Passus Eighteen.

This method tends to reduce all lines to equal importance. No surer formula can be found whereby mountains can be made low and valleys exalted. No method so clearly renounces the art of literary criticism and interpretation as classically practiced by Horace and Longinus, revived in the humanist Renaissance, and at least held in repute ever since. That criticism itself

possesses an imaginative style or signifies fresh evaluation or interpretation, or that Langland commanded a verbal art, are thoughts banished from the pages of these singularly modest exegetes. Their book can undoubtedly be consulted with profit. But there is really a serious question whether Piers' own oxen, the most supernatural team in the poetical record, could draw a modern reader to see the work through as a book to be read. A sympathetic view, then, best regards the work as a directory to Langland's symbolism. The poet's stirring words are consistently paraphrased in modern prose and parallel passages in the Scriptures educed.

HENRY W. WELLS

Inquisitio de Fide. By ERASMUS. Edited with introduction and commentary by CRAIG R. THOMPSON. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950. vi, 131 pp. $3.00.

Students of Erasmus are greatly indebted to Dr. Thompson for having given them an illuminating interpretation of one of the crucial religious colloquies dealing with the apostolic creed. He has introduced the interpretative commentary with an essay which is a model of objective and well balanced judgment of one of the most controversial cases in the history of modern religion. In contrast to the *Convivium Religiosum,* the *Inquisitio de Fide* demonstrates Erasmus' lasting intention to remain orthodox in uttering theological opinions. It is the great merit of Dr. Thompson to have accumulated overwhelming evidence of this Erasmian attitude in his commentary on the text. In particular, the notes on *Nulla Salus extra Ecclesiam* are completely convincing in this respect. Like Professor Pfeifer, Dr. Thompson maintains the stubborn perseverance of Erasmus in holding his own position, independent of Lutheran or Ecclesiastical alignments. The description of the conflict with Luther is correct. It is not completely satisfactory, because there remains one motive of the Erasmian position unexpressed. It is true, indeed, that Erasmus could not easily be moved to write against Luther. It should, however, be emphasized that he was in this struggle with his deepest convictions. These convictions, however, were never basically of a dogmatic nature. He keenly predicted that Luther's revolution would lower the intellectual and cultural standards of society for many centuries to come.[1]

For this reason it should be stated that his concern about the correctness of his theological opinions was a device for securing his program of spiritual and moral education. It is of great importance to study the tremendous material which Dr. Thompson has accumulated in his commentary. The notes and a careful study of all books and essays in which Erasmus deals with theological questions clearly demonstrate that he felt quite uneasy in expressing himself

[1] Goethe was in the Erasmian spirit when he connected Luther and the French Revolution by the very fact that they threw back the vulture of the world for a long time.

rationally about the intricacies of the Trinity. His position is certainly ambiguous. Sometimes he is carried away by his moralistic rationalism.

There are, however, minor points of disagreement with a sovereign and masterly study. There remains one problem that should be opened to discussion. In the tradition of the past, the editor calls Erasmus a scholar and *homme de lettres*. He refuses to understand him as a philosopher. Erasmus himself rejected the term scholar for himself. In a famous letter he renounced this title in favor of Faber Stapulensis. He called himself an educator and reformer, if we are permitted to apply our categories. It seems to me that, from the point of view of modern philosophy, which is concerned with the problems of pragmatism and of anthropology, in particular after William James and William Dilthey, Erasmus' philosophical contribution could be described as spiritual pragmatism. It is indicative of the growing conviction of his philosophical significance that Bernard Groethuysen has given a highly interesting analysis of his philosophy in a volume on Philosophical Anthropology.

Regardless of such theoretical questions, Dr. Thompson has raised the urgent desire to unite the students of Erasmus and, finally, to do some constructive work. There is actually no book by Erasmus which does not deserve a thorough commentary and interpretation. There are, for instance, the prefaces to his editions of the Fathers of the Church, which are most illuminating for his personal religious attitude. Dr. Thompson seems to me, after the death of Professor Allen, the only Erasmian who could organize a working Erasmian Society which would attack the great work to be done. I do not believe that I can express my admiration of Dr. Thompson's scholarship and mastery more clearly than by asking him to organize such a Society.

ALBERT SALOMON

Die Ostkirche. By METROPOLITAN SERAPHIM. (Sammlungn Völkerglaube) Stuttgart: W. Spemann Verlag, 1950. 339 pp. DM 10.80.

This volume prepared by Metropolitan Seraphim, of the Central European Orthodox Metropolitanate, the Rev. Vasily Lengengelder, and Professor Chetverikov, formerly of the Kiev Religious Academy, is one of the most comprehensive and elementary introductions to the Orthodox Church that have yet appeared. The volume can be safely recommended to students, despite the fact that, when it comes to the modern period (as the Metropolitan notes), it is almost entirely devoted in the third section to Russian Christianity, which it treats as normal Orthodoxy, while it overlooks and ignores those aspects of Orthodox devotional life in Greece and the Balkans which differ from those in tsarist Russia. As a corollary to this, the author is inclined to take the piety of the Russian people as the only norm of Orthodoxy and has no word for the impact of the modern world upon it, either in Russia or elsewhere. This is well shown by the great detail into which he goes in regard to the Russian *startsy*, who exercized from Optino a great influence upon Dostoyevsky and

the Slavophiles (pp. 290-308). These pages could well have been cut in half and the space used for an examination of the role of Mount Athos and similar institutions, as well as to a practical consideration of Orthodox monasticism as a whole.

On the other hand, in the first part, the author well emphasizes that special sense of timelessness that characterizes Orthodoxy, that emphasis on the Church as a mode of life even more than as a code of thinking and of action. His discussion of the significance of ikons is excellent, and so is his general treatment of the split between the Eastern and Western Churches. The notes on the history of the various Churches, and also on the non-Orthodox Churches of the East, furnish much material in a brief form and supply information that is elsewhere hard to locate in a convenient compass. He notes the absence of well organized systems of theology in the Orthodox Church since the time of St. John Damascene, but is somewhat too brief with regard to the later medieval period, when the Orthodox were brought face to face with those same problems which they are facing today—the contact with a developing West. He is inclined to wave this aside on the score of an undefiled Russian piety, but once the reader appreciates this fact, he will be able to use the book with profit.

C. A. M.

The Life of St. Sava. By Nicholai D. Velimirovich. Libertyville, Ill.: The Serbian Orthodox Monastery of St. Sava, 1951. x, 233 pp. $2.00.

St. Sava, patron saint of the Serbs, was one of the most distinguished men of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries in the Balkans. The son of the Grand Zupan Nemanja, the creator of the state, Sava was one of those medieval Orthodox monks who alternated long years of retirement on Mount Athos with periods of the most successful political and diplomatic activity. He was not only the organizer of Serb Orthodoxy but was also the steadying factor in the stormy political and family rivalries of the period, a shrewd diplomat in the troubled days of the Latin Empire of Constantinople and a welcome visitor to the court of the Greek Emperor of Nicea and of the Bulgarian rulers of Tirnovo. Bishop Nicholai has retold the life of the saint in accordance with modern historical studies but has retained that atmosphere of devotion, of reverence and other worldliness that characterizes the medieval Orthodox hagiographers. It is a piece of literature as well as of information and inspiration, and it is well worthy of the author, who for many years prior to World War II held the see of St. Sava at Zitcha, restored the Cathedral of St. Sava, and was performing in the twentieth century the same religious work for his people that St. Sava had done in the thirteenth.

C. A. M.

The March of Methodism. By CYRIL J. DAVEY. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1951. xi, 209 pp. $3.75.

Mr. Davey has sketched here the history of the missionary organizations now under the Methodist Missionary Society, touching the high points in a record of more than a century and a half.

Thomas Coke plays a decisive role in establishing the Wesleyan missionary movement. He was a man of some money and a great conviction. In Baltimore, in 1874, he assisted in the consecration of Francis Asbury as Superintendent of the Methodist Church in America. Greatly moved by the sight of negro slaves in America, he set out from England in 1788 for Nova Scotia, but his ship was driven off its course and he landed at St. John on Antigua in the West Indies. There he found a church which had been kept alive for some years by a slave woman. On that Christmas afternoon he preached to a thousand negroes, mostly slaves. This was the beginning of his labors in establishing a missionary movement, often disappointing, but which had great results, including the establishment of missions in India, Africa, China, and the South Sea Islands. Dr. Coke died on shipboard in the Indian Ocean on his way to Ceylon. The fiercest struggle, the most romantic story, and the fullest success of the Methodists came in New Zealand and the South Sea Islands. Indeed, nothing in missionary annals has surpassed the conquest of the cannibal islands.

In the early days, it is interesting to note, laymen, immigrants, sailors, soldiers, teachers, merchants and even slave-holding planters were often more directly the agents of Methodist expansion than the thin line of professional missionaries. It was after 1860 that the appeals of soldiers in North India were heeded and a chaplain was sent to Barrakpore (near Calcutta) and another to Lucknow. From these beginnings grew the fruitful work in Calcutta, Lucknow, and Benares.

There is a note of complaint in "The Twentieth Century Survey," which reminds us that missionaries have mostly been very conservative, often standing in the way of their own success. As late as 1859 "not a few clergymen were still fulminating against the use of such anaesthetics as chloroform and ether which had been introduced into surgery." Mr. Davey refers to the "lagging" success of the present century. One wonders whether he sees that change offers opportunity for leadership and interpretation rather than controversy. Should not the challenge of "opposition" be seen rather as "opportunity"? Has not the Church allowed itself to be *forced* into changed attitudes by examples of Westerners in the East, by world wars, by hard economic burdens and "secularism," because of lack all along of imagination and anticipation with reference to the future? The author himself says that the development of the work would have been more rapid had "the missionaries been more ready to share offices and responsibility fifty years ago."

In recent years a *measure* of unity has been achieved, but here too has not the belated and limited achievement been due to the Churches themselves?

And have not other great historic faiths held Christians as enemies, to a considerable extent because of the attitudes of missionaries?

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

Glaube und Geschichte in der Theologischen Exegese Ernst Lohmeyers. By ERIK ESKING. Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1951. 250 pp. 15 Kr.

Nearly half of this book is given to a history of the ways in which the New Testament has been approached and interpreted since the nineteenth century. Attention is focused on the liberal interpreters, the positive theologians, and the dialectical theologians. The second group, including such men as Martin Kähler and Adolf Schlatter, here receive the attention they deserve. Form criticism and the work of Bultmann are also considered. The author himself steers a middle course between the factual interests of late nineteenth century scholars and contemporary scholars, many of whom, in his estimation, deny the place of the historical.

This section is followed by a shorter one on philosophical currents during the same period. It appears to me to be less adequate than the history of New Testament interpretation, but it is necessary to set the work of Lohmeyer into a proper context. The latter, as Esking convincingly shows, is finally an idealist on all crucial points. The virtue in his position is the attempt to take into account both fact and faith and their interrelationships. Thus Lohmeyer is never onesided, nor does he ever exclude relevant material. But the conflicting views of other men on the interpretation of the Bible are held together in a "metaphysical tension" in such a way that only one already convinced of their unity could hold them. In his analysis of Lohmeyer's work, Dr. Esking has shown the genius and difficulties of an idealist approach to the Bible, particularly when, as in this case, there is a genuine attempt not to give up the historical.

J. D.

The Cosmic Christ. By ALLAN D. GALLOWAY. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951. xiv, 274 pp. $4.00.

The author of this book makes no claim to unearthing new things in the realm of scholarship, but by a careful scrutiny of original and secondary sources, he provides an interpretive study which is fresh and original. It is one of the most exciting books in Christian theology that I have read in a long time.

The central systematic point (developed last in the book) is that the redemptive activity of Christ cannot be understood in either personal or objective terms, but in a togetherness expressed in the correlation of self and world. Man is only man in the context of an environment which forms a part of him,

an environment which threatens him by its impersonal and meaningless aspects, but which also is able to communicate another dimension to him wherever the new reality in Christ is perceived. There is, thus, no personal redemption without cosmic redemption, since man is only man in correlation to a world. This is the truth in all apocalyptic symbols.

Dr. Galloway is convinced that this motive runs throughout biblical history and he does a very convincing job in marshalling the sources. Whereas contemporary men think of the world in impersonal terms, biblical writers thought of nature as alive and under the sway of demonic powers which had been overcome in Christ, though not yet completely. The stubborn character of evil—with its personal and almost metaphysical base—made necessary the apocalyptic imagery in which the end is the redemption of the world and men.

On this level the problem of the early theologians was that of translating the Jewish apocalyptic imagery into the new world of the Gentiles. In this they were only partially successful. Irenaeus is a significant member of this tradition and fails in part because the imagery of the Gentile world, particularly Gnosticism, has become too diverse for successful usage. The greatest attempt was that of Origen, who failed because the Greek suspicion of the world influenced him in the direction of suggesting flight above the world rather than its transformation. Thus the early Church failed to work out a proper theory of cosmic redemption.

Nor was this rectified in subsequent history. The Middle Ages continued a line of development in which the Church was the arena of the Kingdom in and above the world. The eventual result of the disruption of the medieval world and the creation of the modern was a situation in which there was, on the one side, an impersonal world (in impact analagous to the ancient world of demons) and, on the other, personality divorced from integral relation with the world. This was expressed most graphically in Kant and overcome, though on impossible grounds, in Hegel. This historical development, here boldly stated but impressively arrayed in the book, is followed by a constructive statement, the essence of which I gave in the second paragraph.

J. D.

Some Tendencies in British Theology. By J. K. Mozley. London: S. P. C. K., 1951. 166 pp. 10*s* 6*d*.

Beginning with the publication of *Lux Mundi* in 1889, this posthumous work of the late Dr. John K. Mozley conducts the reader through nearly all of the major and minor trends in British theology down to the early nineteen-forties. Writing with the ease, the almost conversational familiarity with his subject which is so often the hallmark of Anglican scholarship, and referring to most of the published works of dozens of theologians of the period, the author is concerned less to take sides in the various debates than to present each trend as an expression of one facet of the whole faith of the Church.

The series of analyses which results, brilliant to the point of epigram, is certainly unsurpassed in the lucidity and perceptiveness with which it captures both the essence and the nuances of different theological positions.

That this generosity of approach does not lend itself to sharp distinctions between issues, to comprehensive, systematic treatment of them, or even to a very high degree of selectivity, the author is explicitly aware. Instead of regarding this as a weakness, however, he reminds those who find it "irritating and vexatious" that the British preference for the historical and concrete, as opposed to the speculative and abstract, has a significant precedent: the Bible itself. This tentativeness, this reluctance to engage in controversy, is reflected in the style itself, which abounds in double negatives, circumlocution, and indirection. On this account, as the author himself has anticipated, the book is apt to contribute more to historical than to systematic theology.

It is understandable that such an approach should be most at home in the field of English theology, which receives a somewhat impersonal quality from the changing ecclesiastical situation which it reflects—the shifting constellation of Evangelical, Liberal, Fundamentalist, Tractarian, Anglo-Catholic movements. In the case of Scotland, however, where continental influence has brought about a greater emphasis on theological issues for their own sake, the author is obliged to consider each theologian separately, a kind of treatment to which his method is less well suited. Nevertheless, though written from within the Anglican tradition, the book is thoroughly cognizant of the contribution of Scotland, as well as of English Nonconformist theologians. If it dwells longer on developments of the recent past than on what seems to be the most crucial issues of the present, this only emphasizes how great a loss it is that such a distinguished scholar did not live to put the final touches to his last work.

E. La B. Cherbonnier

Christ and Time. By Oscar Cullmann. Translated by Floyd V. Filson. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950. 253 pp. $5.00.

Oscar Cullmann, one of the most prominent of European biblical scholars, is a colleague of Karl Barth's at Basel, and his theological differences with Barth are known to readers of the untranslated volumes of Barth's *Dogmatik*. Floyd V. Filson has now made available in English a work which had already achieved fame in its German and French editions.

Cullmann's aim is to present the essential kernel of the New Testament proclamation apart from personal "subjective" concerns or the criteria of any previously established philosophical viewpoint. Many, of course, will challenge the possibility of such an enterprise, but Cullmann is completely clear on his purpose. The kernel he defines as the "Christian conception of time and history." The New Testament, as he sees it, conceives of salvation as bound to a continuous time process, which may be represented by a straight ascending

time line. Here is the rejection of all cyclical views of time and all assumptions of an "eternity" standing in contrast to time. Eternity in the New Testament means simply "endless time," ages succeeding ages.

At the "mid-point" of the Gospel time line is the unrepeatable historical event which is decisive for salvation, the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Thus the numbering of years in the two series, B.C. and A.D., though the custom developed rather late, accords with the inner logic of Christian thought.

Only specialists in New Testament studies can evaluate Cullmann's detailed evidence and the logic which he builds upon it. Since they are not unanimous, either in support or rejection of it, theologians must make the best of their indecision. It is evident that, if Cullmann is right, the *totum simul* of Roman Catholicism (and some Protestantism) is quite contrary to the New Testament. Theologians have long premised their analyses on the linear, rather than the cyclical, conception of time; however, they usually have not denied any qualitative difference between time and eternity, as Cullmann does. Cullmann himself is reluctant to draw the philosophical conclusions which usually go with the conception of sheer *durée,* for he writes at one point: "God is superior to time. He rules over time. From the beginning he is in control of these stages" (p. 70).

Another controversial point where many New Testament scholars challenge Cullmann, is his statement that "the faith of Primitive Christianity is completely unified and consistent" (p. 217). Few issues can more quickly start an argument among biblical specialists these days than the question of unity and diversity in the New Testament. In general the present tendency, after some decades of emphasis on the varieties of New Testament religion, is to find an impressive unity. But it is one thing to recover this common testimony in the New Testament, and another to find a jigsaw puzzle in which the various writers furnish interlocking pieces with no confusion and no left-over pieces.

Whether raising problems or offering solutions, Cullmann is stimulating and scholarly. His book has justly won acclaim as one of the important biblical works of recent years.

ROGER L. SHINN

The Christian Understanding of God. By NELS F. S. FERRÉ. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951. ix, 277 pp. $3.75.

This is the fourth volume in an ambitious series by the Professor of Philosophical Theology at the Vanderbilt School of Religion. He takes account of great philosophical and theological works of the past, scrutinizes contemporary writings with both candor and generosity, and attempts to develop his own independent position. Special attention is devoted to Augustine and Aquinas, and to such contemporaries as Whitehead, Hartshorne,

Brightman, Tillich, Aulén, Barth, and Brunner. For the most part, however, the author makes passing references to these writers instead of dealing with them in a systematic fashion.

The book is well organized so far as general structure is concerned. In the first section it discusses the *nature* of God, his relation to the world, time and eternity, and divine sovereignty. In the second section it discusses the *work* of God in creation and providence, in revelation, in incarnation, and in "last things." Taking *Agapê* as his guiding clue, Professor Ferré seeks to overcome many of the dichotomies of traditional theology. For example, he shows how God can be both Being and Becoming; how He can be immanent in the world without destroying the distinction between Creator and creature; how He can be personal without being limited; how He can incorporate temporality without being trapped in it. His treatment of the role of natural theology, the doctrine of the Incarnation, and belief in eternal life also reflects a gift for mediating between extremes and for surveying traditional material in a bold, unfettered manner. At several points, however, the argument seems less than convincing e.g., where he attempts to show that God has a body and a subconscious; where he holds that God foreknows the future in so far as it is determinable and does *not* in so far as freedom is operative, yet seems to be quite confident concerning the outcome of history and the destiny of man; and where he uses the "Why couldn't it have happened?" method, especially with reference to the resurrected body of Jesus (p. 213).

For teaching purposes in American theological seminaries we need a book which stands somewhere between Brunner's *Doctrine of God* and Charles Hartshorne's *Man's Vision of God;* in other words, we need a book which will take account of the historical setting of Protestant doctrine *and* of the current scene in British and American philosophy. Volumes by W. R. Matthews, W. E. Hocking, and E. S. Brightman are helpful in many ways, but each has its limitations, because of special interests or special pleading, when one is looking for a treatise that will bridge the gap between revealed theology and philosophical theism. Unfortunately the present book does not meet the need as well as one might desire. A student cannot gain from it an adequate notion of the major "live options." Although he can find definite statements concerning Ferré's conclusions, he will have great difficulty in discovering how they might be tested, either theologically or philosophically. Finally, despite his commendable attitude toward philosophy, the author uses it, mainly, only in so far as he can incorporate it. Admittedly there are respects in which such a book must develop entirely within theological presuppositions; nevertheless, it fails to communicate with non-Christian or anti-Christian critics at several points where this is possible.

D. E. R.

Die religiöse Erfahrung der Naturfölker. By PAUL RADIN. Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1951. 128 pp.

Dr. Radin criticizes such "theorists" as Lévy-Bruhl, Van der Leeuw, Cassirer, etc. for their tendency to describe primitive religion in terms of their own philosophical presuppositions, instead of using available data on the actual religious experience of primitives as they themselves describe it.

Contribution to a Bibliography of Indian Art and Aesthetics. By HARIDAS MITRA. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1951. 240 pp. Rs. 12.

This monograph will be of inestimable value to the student of Indian art. The volume is divided into two parts, An Introduction (73 pp.) and a List of Texts (164 pp.). For the general student, the Introduction is the most useful part, containing sections on origins and foreign influences, iconography, architecture, painting, and a chronological list of legendary and historical masters. The classified list of *Vastu-śastras* and *Śilpa-śastras* will be of interest to the specialist in this recondite subject.

Buddhism. By CHRISTMAS HUMPHREYS. Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1951. 256 pp. 35¢.

Teachers of the history of religion are greatly indebted to the publishers of pocket books for making available to students a veritable little library at insignificant cost. This particular "Pelican," written by the founder of the Buddhist Society of London, is a clear, concise summary of the subject, with a useful glossary, bibliography, and index, and sixteen interesting illustrations.

The I Ching, or Book of Changes. The Richard Wilhelm translation rendered into English by CARY F. BAYNES. 2 vols. New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1950. xi, 393; 376 pp. $7.50.

The Sinologist may shake his head in disapproval of a "translation of a translation" such as this, but the fact remains that it is the only English version of this classic which has much to offer the general reader. Wilhelm's advantage over Legge lies in the fact that he was not only a competent linguist but also a philosopher, and one who learned his Confucianism from a scholar of the old school who understood the metaphysics attaching to this remarkable example of ancient "wisdom literature."

East and West in Religion. By S. RADHAKRISHNAN. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.: New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. 146 pp. $1.50.

This small book contains important lectures by an eminent Indian philosopher who devotes his great talents to the task of interpreting the East to

the West. The first two lectures, "Comparative Religion," and "East and West in Religion," will probably be of most value to readers of this journal.

Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy. Edited by W. R. Inge, L. P. Jacks, M. Hiriyanna, E. A. Burtt, and P. T. Raju. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. 408 pp. $5.00.

This collection of twenty-one short essays by eminent scholars was published in honor of Dr. Radhakrishnan's sixtieth birthday, and consists of comparative studies in Eastern and Western philosophy. One of the most original and arresting of these is by D. M. Datta, of Patna University, entitled "Philosophy of the Body: A New Approach to the Body Problem from Western and Eastern Philosophies."

Sufism. By A. J. Arberry. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. 141 pp. $2.00.

Teachers of religion are greatly indebted to the author for this first short history of Sufism, which contains brief, succinct accounts of the principal mystics of Islam, with quotations from their writings. Chapter Seven, "The Structure of Sufi Theory and Practice," is especially valuable for its analysis of the key concepts of Sufi thought.

Atlas of Islamic History. Compiled by Harry W. Hazard. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1951. 49 pp.

Here we have the history of the spread of Islam clearly set forth, century by century, in a series of well designed maps in color, with dates of conquest, population statistics, and brief paragraphs on the Arabic culture of the period. But, on the whole, the Atlas contains very little useful information on the *religion* of Islam, and the history of its development.

The Reader's Bible. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. xlvii, 1267, 304, 367 pp. $6.50.

This mighty volume of almost 2,000 pages contains the complete text of the Authorized Version of the Old and New Testaments and the Apocrypha. The description on the jacket informs us that it is intended for "general reading" and is, therefore, printed in the form of a modern book instead of in "the antiquated double-column format." But it seems to this "general reader" that it defeats its purpose by its very bulk and heft! For curling up with in the easy chair, give us back our old *light,* limp-leather, antiquated double-column Bible, with its handily numbered verses and chapter headings, so useful for

finding quotations. This handsome book would be an honor to any bookshelf, but we doubt whether it will be a cherished bedside companion.

A Protestant Dictionary. By VERGILIUS FERM. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. ix, 283 pp. $5.00.

Once again Professor Ferm puts us in his debt for a useful reference book. For so small a book, it is remarkably complete, illustrating well its author's unusual gift for the compact and succinct statement of fact. Would there were more like him!

The Way of Mysticism: An Anthology. Arranged by JOSEPH JAMES. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951. 274 pp. $3.00.

In his Introduction, the author states that this anthology, like all others, is "based on one man's personal preferences," and to the reader, these preferences reveal the breadth and depth and catholicity of the author's mind. But a really carping critic might object to the inclusion of so *much* of St. John of the Cross, St. Teresa of Avila, and Kierkegaard, and the omission altogether of Francis Thompson. But that also is a matter of "personal preference."

Puritanism and Liberty. Edited by A. S. P. WOODHOUSE. Chicago: University Press, 1951. 506 pp. $4.50.

This is a second edition of an important work, the Army Debates of 1647-9 from the Clarke Manuscripts, with supplementary documents. This book, to quote the Foreword by A. D. Lindsay, "has become a standard text for all who wish to study the early beginnings of western democratic ideas. This study has now assumed a new importance since the rise and spread of an entirely new idea of democracy in eastern Europe." For here we see "the fundamental connection between western democracy and liberty, and the opposition between democracy and any kind of totalitarianism."

Sir Isaac Newton: Theological Manuscripts. Edited by H. MCLACHLAN. Liverpool: At the University Press, 1950. 147 pp. $1.75.

It is not generally known that the great scientist was also an ardent theologian and left a collection of theological manuscripts containing well over a million words. His executor, Dr. Thomas Pellett, F.R.S., examined the papers and rendered the following verdict: "Not fit to be printed." Since Newton was somewhat heterodox in his views, he had shrunk from the controversy

which their publication would bring upon him. The selections published here reveal the great breadth of his interests and his careful study of the Bible and the Church Fathers. His attack on Athanasius is particularly spicy.

Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto. By Alfred Owen Aldridge. *(Transactions of the American Philosophical Society.* New Series. Vol. 41, part 2. pp. 297-385). Philadelphia, 1951. $1.50.

Throughout this thorough and excellent study, the author defends Shaftesbury as a *theist,* rather than a *deist,* and maintains that he was not really anti-Christian. Passages which "ridicule a literal interpretation of the Scriptures and snipe at absurd doctrines and traditions" are merely "higher criticism," and not anti-Christian. It was his "uniquivocal insistence that ridicule is a legitimate weapon to be used against imposture in all subjects, including religion" which caused him to be classified as a deist, whereas, in fact, he was a theist and "a settled Christian."

St. Bonaventure University Commemorative Volume. Franciscan Studies, XI (1951), Nos. 3-4. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1951. v, 435 pp.

This volume contains thirteen important articles by well known Franciscan scholars in the field of medieval philosophy and theology, as well as in the history of the Franciscan order itself. The last article, "The History of St. Bonaventure University," by Irenaeus Herscher, O.F.M., presents an illuminating picture of the Franciscan contribution to education in America, beginning with their erection of the first public school in 1524, and culminating with the founding of St. Bonaventure in 1859.

Mélanges Jules Lebreton 2 vols. *Recherches de science religieuse,* xxxix (1951), Num. 2-4; xl (1952), Num. 1-2. Paris: Aux bureaux de la revue, 1951-1952. 480; 480 pp. 1,500 Fr. a volume.

These two impressive volumes of articles by sixty-nine of the most eminent scholars in France, both lay and clerical, cover a wide range of subject matter. It is, in fact, the wide range exhibited in the works of the Revered Father Lebreton himself, a scholar in the great tradition of a humanistic culture. A union of many disciplines produced in him an authority in the diverse fields of classical literature, Christian origins, patristic theology, mysticism, etc. It is, of course impossible to *review* a work of this sort, or to single out individual articles for comment among so many treasures. One can only recommend it in terms of the highest praise to all students of religion.

Vanderbilt Studies in the Humanities. Vol. I. Edited by RICHMOND C. BEATTY, J. PHILIP HYATT, and MONROE K. SPEARS. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1951. viii, 275 pp. $3.50.

The purpose and scope of this work may be described best in the words of Chancellor Branscomb in the Preface: "The range and quality of work in the Humanities at Vanderbilt must be seen in a collection of this sort to be fully appreciated. Its unity is a growing experience. We hope, moreover, that the appearance of this and future collections will encourage at Vanderbilt—and elsewhere—scholarship which goes beyond the limitations of single disciplines, which crosses freely departmental boundaries and demonstrates the essential unity of all studies dealing with man." This wide range appears in the chapter titles: "Why the Modern South Has a Great Literature"; "Shepherd of Hermas, Parable II"; "The Deuteronomic Edition of Jeremiah"; "Petrarch's Doctrine of Meditation"—etc., etc.

Hauptdaten zur Religions- und Geisteschichte der Menschheit. By JOHANN BAPTIST AUFHAUSER. 2nd ed. Speyer Rh.: Pilger-Verlag, 1951. 80 pp. DM 2.90.

This is an amazing little book, containing, as it does, a great number of dates important in the history of religions, all the way from 2000 million years B.C. to 1950! Leafing through it, century by century, the reader obtains a cross-section view of contemporaneous events and personalities, quite different from the vertical-line approach, and achieves at least a glimmer of understanding of the ancient Chinese belief in a pattern underlying the coincidence of events.

The Faith of the Church. By JAMES A. PIKE and W. NORMAN PITTENGER. New York: The National Council, Protestant Episcopal Church, 1951. 214 pp. $1.50.

This is the third volume in a series called "The Church's Teaching," designed to help the intelligent layman to a better understanding of Anglican Christianity. The present volume deals with the important subject of theology. In its treatment of the Apostolic Succession (pp. 137-40) this book gives little comfort to those working for reunion with other Protestant church bodies.

The Assumption of Our Lady and Catholic Theology. By VICTOR BENNETT and RAYMOND WINCH. London: S.P.C.K., 1950; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. 120 pp. $1.00.

This passionate and well-reasoned protest by two Catholic laymen was published just before the Dogma of the Assumption was proclaimed by the Pope.

It refutes the doctrine on both historical and theological grounds, and attacks it roundly in terms of expediency as well, on the grounds that "a papal definition at this time would give offence in almost every non-Roman quarter and prove a very severe discouragement to all who are striving or hoping for future unity." But a more serious charge is the danger to the Church itself in the tendency to elevate the Blessed Virgin to a place of equality with Christ himself, as well as the danger of bringing the doctrine of infallibility of the Church into disrepute.

The Theology of Albert Schweitzer, for Christian Inquirers. By E. N. Mozley. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951. vii, 117 pp. $2.00.

Schweitzer's theology is expounded here by means of brief statements by the author, followed by pertinent quotations from Schweitzer himself. In his epilogue Schweitzer reiterates his belief in the overwhelming importance of Jewish eschatology for Jesus and his disciples. When this hope of an immediate coming of the Kingdom was not fulfilled, it became necessary to substitute "the distant view for the near view," and create a Church to provide a mechanism of salvation by means of continuous forgiveness of sins, with the Resurrection and Day of Judgment as the final goal. The next step is to discard eschatology and regard the Kingdom of God "as something ethical and spiritual, . . . to be realized with the co-operation of men," in an attitude of world acceptance.

Communism's Challenge to Christianity. By Arthur Vööbus. Maywood, Ill.: Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary, 100 pp.

Professor Vööbus writes from bitter experience of communist aggression, having been a member of the faculty of the University of Tartu, in Estonia. The first four chapters contain his indictment of Communism; the last four, an attack on Protestant theologians (especially the Amsterdam Conference) for their failure to understand the nature of Communism. With a pungent criticism he takes apart the "indifferentists," such as Barth and his followers, as well as the fatuous "fellow travellers," such as E. Stanley Jones, Hewlett Johnson, William H. Melish, etc., convicting them out of their own mouths of intellectual childishness and moral obtuseness. This little book truly "packs a big wallop"!

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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NEW PERIODICALS

Internationale Zeitschriftenschau für Bibelwissenschaft und Grenzgebiete. 1951/52. Heft 1. Edited by DR. FRIDOLIN STIER, University of Tübingen. Published by Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, Stuttgart. DM 14.60 a year.

Orientalia Suecana, Vol. I, No. 1 (1952). Edited by ERIK GREN. Uppsala: Universitetsbiblioteket. Kr. 20:—a year.

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Minos. Investigaciones y Materiales para el estudio de los textos paleocretenses, publicados bajo la dirección de Antonio Tovar y Emilio Perezzi. Vol. I (1952?), fasc. 1. Universidad de Salamanca. 120 ptas. a year.

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This recently revived and newly expanded publication, originally devoted exclusively to articles on the Reformation, broadened its scope in 1938 to include the history of the Reformation and world affairs. In 1944 it had to suspend publication. The new publication has now become an international journal, the editorial board of which includes Gerhard Titter, Harold J. Grimm, Roland H. Bainton, and Heinrich Bornkamm. It includes significant articles not only on the Reformation but on the history of Protestantism as well.